[This was my final for my Arab-Israeli conflict class last semester; I figured it was about time to post it here since its been a while since I’ve posted anything. It was something I actually really enjoyed writing, since I didn’t know much of anything about the conflict when going into the class. I find it absolutely fascinating now.]
As Aaron David Miller states in the opening of The Much Too Promised Land, promises have been made by four different parties over the course of history regarding Palestine: first by God, second the British, third the United Nations; fourth the United States. While disputing the validity of the first party would be better suited for a theological discussion, the latter three parties are of particular historic interest when examining the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is not only these three parties which are of interest in the greater conflict, but a whole cast of actors in a play where the Palestinians and Israelis take center stage. Some played more minor roles than others; some played villains and some heroes depending on one’s outlook on the conflict. And still, those characters proved to be so dynamic that, in the eyes of some, they often swapped sides between “good” and “evil.” The British were the single major player throughout much of the first half of the 20th century, the United Nations filled a relatively minor supporting role where it said much and did little; the United States is the newest major player in the search for a resolution to the conflict. Along the way have been the various Arab states and their antagonistic policies towards the Israelis, French policies backing the British; even the waning Ottoman Empire made an appearance. All of these actors have had interests in Palestine, and all of them have attempted to exercise those interests. The next few pages shall discuss these parties, their interests, the means through which they attempted to implement those interests, and their successes and failures in implementing said interests. Perhaps it would be bold of me to say that it is all quite ‘interesting.’
In the early days of the Palestinian conflict, before there was a true conflict, there were two facts known: there were Arabs in Palestine, and Jews in Europe. Avi Shlaim describes the situation in the opening of The Iron Wall: “The Zionist movement, which emerged in Europe in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, aimed at the national revival of the Jewish people in its ancestral home after nearly 2000 years in exile.” This “Zionism” found its roots in Europe for two reasons: much of the diaspora had settled in Europe following the sack of Jerusalem at the hands of Titus, and their time spent living in Europe had been made “uncomfortable” by European leaders. On the opposite side of the stage, in the Promised Land itself, the star playing opposite the Zionists entered. As Morris states in Righteous Victims, Zionism had a twenty-five year head start on Palestinian-Arab Nationalism, which was developing in the latter half of the nineteenth century in opposition to the Ottomans. While, as Morris points out, the Arabs were loyal to the Islamic polity of the Ottoman Empire, many desired political distance. These feelings strengthened in 1877 when St. Petersburg declared war on Istanbul. Many Arab conscripts died in the war, which ultimately led to Ottoman defeat, and further alienated the Turks from Arabs. During this period, ups and downs would occur in Arab nationalism, and the first Aliyah (also influenced by Russia, but through pogroms) would bring thousands of Zionist settlers to the region. Morris points out in Victims that, although many returned to Russia or headed West, between 1881 and 1903 roughly 20,000 to 30,000 Jews made the journey to Palestine. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the stage had been set for the two principal actors in the drama. Their objectives were clear: the Zionists wanted a state in Palestine; the Palestinians had similar ambitions. Neither would deviate from these goals. It was time for the first of the major supporting cast members to enter in the throes of the Great War.
Two fateful shots fired in Sarajevo in June 1914 plunged the world into a war the scale of which had not yet been seen. While the First World War would be fought primarily on the fields of France, it would forever change the face of the Middle East. In November of 1914, the Ottomans threw their lot in with the Germans in the Central Powers’ struggle against the Allies, and the British, who Morris points out had previously worked towards maintaining the status quo in the Middle East to prevent other imperial powers from gaining where the Ottomans would lose, now felt that their own interests were at risk. The war would see the British deal duplicitously with various parties in the region during their struggle against the Ottomans, as they would make dealings and promises with both groups on the Arabian peninsula as well as Zionist influences within Britain. As Morris explains, it was the Suez Canal which made the British especially fearful for their imperial possessions. Once Turkey had been taken care of, however, Britain had another concern: containing Russian imperial interests. The British turned to the local Arab populations, first, who in 1915 finally managed to convince the British to support an Arab revolt against the Ottomans. The Arabs, of course, sought independence from the Ottomans; the British would perhaps grant them “autonomy under British tutelage.” Finally, in November 1915, the approximate shape of the interbellum Middle East was formed with the entry of Britain’s lesser accomplice to the drama in Palestine: France. François Georges-Picot and Sir Mark Sykes would meet in relative secret until, in 1916, an agreement divided the Middle East into two zones of influence between them. French interests were straightforward: secure influence, and solidify France’s political power in the region. Britain’s intentions, meanwhile, were similar, but took on a different aspect as the Zionist lobby gained clout within Whitehall. Chaim Weizmann in particular, Shlaim states, was crucial in winning over the British to the Zionist cause. Weizmann played off of both the British interests in having a friendly nation in the region (mainly to protect trade routes through the Suez), but also played off of British values. The fact that he wore a suit and tie rather than robes and sandals perhaps also made him more tolerable for the British. Regardless, in November 1917 Weizmann’s efforts bore fruit as His Majesty’s Government’s Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour issued his famous declaration. The waning hours of the Ottoman Empire finally past, it was time for Palestine to fall into the hands of a power even further removed than Istanbul: London.
Immediately following the war, Arabic reactions to the Balfour Declaration were “disapproving” at best. In 1919, the “Syrian Arab Congress” convened under Faisal I, and declared its opposition to Zionism and the settlement of Palestine. Britain and France together waved off the declaration from Faisal, and the Zionists were permitted to continue their settlement by the British as they laid the groundwork for their eventual “commonwealth.” Violence between the Arabs and Zionists was largely averted during this early period; Morris specifically cites the annual Nabi Musa celebrations, where anti-Zionist sentiments ran rampant. Violence in this particular case, and overall, was prevented by precautions taken by the British military. It was finally in July of 1922 that the British were officially granted their Mandate by the League of Nations over Palestine. The Mandate included the entire text of the Balfour Declaration, and specifically outlined that it was “the Mandatory power’s duty” to facilitate the Jewish people’s establishment of institutions. It was during this period that Khalidi points to the Palestinians prodding the British for self determination and national institutions similar to those being developed for the Jews; they cited Wilson’s fourteen points as the basis of their claims. Their pleas seemed to fall on deaf ears, as each time they asked they were told to accept the Mandate and their status within its framework. This is the Iron Cage which Khalidi describes in the title of his book: the Palestinians were denied their political rights, unless they accepted a charter which granted them no political rights. In order to maintain control over the country, Khalidi adds, the British, unlike in other regions where they utilized local rulers to carry out their policies, maintained direct control over the Mandate. The Jews were granted autonomy within this Mandate, and even had diplomatic representation through the Jewish Agency; the Arabs had no such thing. While the British were not entirely malevolent here, they did little to help.
British control led to erratic governance, where Whitehall and Westminster were detached from the daily policy making, and such policies were left to local officers to make. The result was a period of flip-flopping, between pandering to the Zionists and sympathy towards the Arabs, by the Mandatory authority. The Arabs gradually grew weary of the situation, and in 1936 took up arms. This first revolt was especially long and bloody, and led to sporadic periods of violence. Bickering between the Arabs and Jews climaxed by 1939, when a rebellion claimed the lives of nearly 100 Jews and over 400 Arabs. Britain, growing weary of the cost of the conflict, issued the White Paper of 1939 in May under Chamberlain’s government. The White Paper represented an absolute about-face in British policy, as their interests changed from assisting the Jews to merely appeasing the Arabs to end the violence: it limited immigration, halted Jews from buying land; among other restrictions. The Zionists were outraged, and revisionist elements in particular (namely Haganah, a paramilitary organization of the time) began a guerrilla war against the British. Even so, antipathy towards the British was short-lived: worldwide war was imminent once again, and this time it would have special significance for not only the Zionists, but Jews everywhere. On September 1st, 1939, German tanks rolled into Poland. On September 3rd, 1939, Britain declared war on Germany. The world was yet again plunged into war, this one more destructive than the previous. The same day as the British declaration of war, the Jewish Agency declared its allegiance to the British. During the war, however, a campaign of illegal immigration by Jews into Palestine was undertaken in opposition to the standards established by the 1939 White Paper. Although the British were harsh in punishing it, the status-quo of the White Paper was only kept in place to keep the Arabs complacent, even after the German threat to the Middle East was eliminated. When Churchill came to the Premiership, he set to work filling his councils with pro-Zionists in preparation for the post-war period. As it turned out, he likely did not need to do so, as the Germans had succeeded in making the strongest case yet for the establishment of a Jewish state: the “greatest pogrom of all time,” the Holocaust.
In 1947, the British washed their hands of Palestine. It was now the infant United Nations’ turn to take charge in finding a solution. On November 29th, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of a partition resolution, a solution ruled out by the 1939 White Paper. The land was to be divided between the Jews and the Arabs, with the Jews receiving more land but mostly in the desert. It was seen as the best means for peace, which was among the UN’s only objectives. Morris points out that the resolution passed by a slim margin, but more interesting was the fact that Britain abstained from the vote. After only a day, though, war came. In the short term, the country was still nominally under the protection of the British, which kept the Arab states at bay. The British did not keep the Palestinians down, though, as the first stage of war, from 1947 to 1948, took the form of a civil war. In five months of fighting, the Jews had dealt crushing blows to Palestinian numbers, military capabilities, and morale. On May 14th, with the British in full withdrawal, the Jews declared themselves as the state of Israel. The second phase of the war, as well as the latter half of the 20th century, began.
The Arab nations had been playing a background role in the conflict for some time; it was now that they would step into the fray as Israel’s main antagonists. From May 15, 1948 until the spring of 1949, hostilities would exist between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The Israelis would use lessons learned in the first stage of the war to excel in combat against the Arab armies. Morris mentions that, in the early days, the British came back for an encore performance, and brought their old friends, the French, and their new friends, the Americans: the three nations executed an arms embargo against the Middle East. The measure devastated Arab supply lines, as they were dependent upon British and French arms imports. The Israelis, meanwhile, had resorted to dealing with private sellers and the Czechs; they had the cash and connections to successfully do so. By 1949, the Arab armies had more or less been crushed, and armistice talks proved fruitful in securing Israel. For the next few decades, wars would be intermittent as Arab goals shifted from the destruction of Israel to saving face; the Americans and Soviets would step in on the sides of Israel and the Arabs, respectively, as battle lines were drawn during the Cold War. Despite this polarized atmosphere, the Americans would take on yet another role; one which would last them into the new millenium as the primary power broker in Palestine.
Despite support for Israel, American interests also played into the peace process. The Suez Crisis in 1956 marked the end of British and French colonial ambitions, and the beginning of the dominance of American and Soviet spheres. As mentioned, the two would go on to oppose each other in the Middle East through their Israeli and Arabic client states, but even so the Americans had a vested interest in a peace process. While America supplied Israel with arms on one hand, it sent diplomats to the region to initiate talks between the Israelis and Arabs. As Miller points out in Promised Land, domestic interests in the United States play a crucial factor in US policy, and peace is perhaps the best method to attempt to cater to all interests within America on the issue. During the Cold War, dialogue with the Arab states also meant many could be wrenched from the Soviets’ grip. More importantly, especially today, peace brings stability and security to the region, and ensures the safety of Israel. Such was part of the agenda when Sadat extended his hand to the Israelis, and Jimmy Carter ran with it to Camp David. Other Arab states soon followed; when Israel’s position within the Middle East was secured with most of its neighbors, the US realized the need for the internal peace process to kick into high gear. Such is the nature of the peace process today, as the Palestinians still dream of statehood.
External interested parties have always had a stake in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from as nearby as Cairo, to as far away as London, Moscow, and Washington. Perhaps the most successful party in achieving its goals thus far have been the Americans, whose devotion to the peace process has brought stability in the region between the Arab states and Israel. Now, however, comes America’s greatest hurdle: the internal status of the Palestinians. Other parties have either changed or abandoned their goals: the Arabs have mostly accepted Israel’s existence, the British have largely removed themselves from the situation since the failure of the Mandate, the French have retreated from the region nearly altogether, the Russians first indirectly affected the situation (as with pogroms) but then supplied Arab states to supplant American interests prior to the end of the Cold War; the Turks lost all stake in the area with the fall of their Empire. Will American efforts go the way of the British? Or can American promises pull through and see the establishment of a Palestinian polity? “Never,” “no way,” and “not a chance” are all the most likely answers, but one thing is certain: until failure actually comes about, the United States will surely keep persisting in its efforts.
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