The Russian Federation has a troubled history with Afghanistan, perhaps most notably the blundered invasion perpetrated during the Soviet Era that saw the Soviet war machine get bogged down in a nation which has destroyed countless empires throughout history. Considering this past, contemporary Russian foreign policy regarding Afghanistan in the post-Soviet era is one of the rare instances where Russian policy goals roughly overlap with the goals of Russia’s counterparts in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Because of the overlap in interests, Russia has pursued a tentative and limited strategic “partnership” with the North Atlantic alliance in support of the alliance’s efforts in Afghanistan. While the overlap in goals is not entire nor complete, and there are, as always, tensions and disagreements, the Russian government acknowledges that NATO’s efforts to pacify the situation in Afghanistan and establish regional stability are, ultimately, within Russia’s interests.
Use of the word “partnership” may be debatable, however presently the Russian Federation, as of an agreement made in Bucharest in April 2008, permits the transit of supplies for ISAF and NATO forces in Afghanistan through Russian territory by road, rail, or air transit.1 The cargo is limited to non-lethal materiel only: mostly commercial goods and other relief supplies intended for troops and for humanitarian purposes, but the route is critical to NATO’s supply lines nonetheless. More recently, in March 2012, a proposal was made to lease an airbase in the city of Ulyanovsk for use in NATO’s logistical supply lines. While materiel is currently permitted to traverse through Russian territory, the lease would be the first instance of an actual NATO base on Russian soil.2 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs later rebuffed accusations that it was permitting a NATO military presence on Russian territory, stressing that the agreement would only permit civilian infrastructure, goods, and storehouses to be used in the transit of non-lethal goods to the Afghan theater of operations.3 In the same memo, however, the Russian government clarified that separate, bilateral agreements with the United States, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Sweden were being actively implemented to permit the transit of arms, personnel, and other military-type cargoes through Russian territory by air. The nature of these bi-lateral agreements, and how they are downplayed alongside a deal with NATO, illustrates the delicate political position that the Russian government is in regarding cooperation with NATO states.
According to an article published by Reuters, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was quoted as saying that these moves towards closer ties and cooperation were being pursued “within the Russian national interest.” According to Lavrov, there are two things at the top of his agenda when dealing with Afghanistan: drugs and terrorism.4 In the same article, Lavrov went on to discuss the proposed 2014 ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan: a date he feels is premature. Lavrov clarified that he believes NATO withdrawing prematurely from Afghanistan would leave a “security vacuum” near Russia’s border, in a region where the Soviet Union fought a bloody conflict from 1979 to 1989 and lost 15,000 of its sons5 (a specter which still haunts Moscow to this day). Because of this, Russia’s tentative yet vocal support for the coalition forces working in Afghanistan works to Moscow’s benefit: the Russians are able to reap the rewards of a stable and secure southern border without exerting effort (nor expending young lives) toward that goal.
Of course, there is a tradeoff. Initially, when the conflict in Afghanistan started in 2001, Russia was hesitant and wary towards the activities below its southern border and within its sphere of influence. Particularly, United States involvement in the region has caused the United States to form partnerships and alliances with nations such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan: nations traditionally seen as well within the Russian sphere of influence.6 The erosion of its influence from the Soviet era is something Moscow has experienced in the past, such as with the accession to NATO of various post-Communist states, but it is also something that Moscow will never entirely get used to nor come to terms with. Despite this, Russia has little choice in accepting further erosion of its influence: if Russia would prefer to continue not having to devote its own forces to the security of the region, it will have to continue to accept the United States and NATO being involved in its backyard.
Russia has even tacitly acknowledged the fact that NATO involvement is within its interests, however with a large slant towards its own agenda. In 2011, current Deputy Premier and then-Russian ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin said to the French newspaper Le Figaro: “We don’t want NATO to go and leave us to face the jackals of war after stirring up the anthill. Immediately after the NATO withdrawal, they will expand towards Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and it will become our problem then.”7 The Russian government fears that, following the withdrawal of NATO troops, the new government in Afghanistan will be laden with former-Taliban extremists. Russia has had painful experiences in recent memory regarding Islamic terrorism and extremism, considering the conflicts in Chechnya and the various subway and airport terminal bombings which were borne of that war. The Russians are rightfully wary of an unstable and potentially extremist-laden Afghan government straddling its southern sphere of influence. Foreign Minister Lavrov addressed the issue of premature withdrawal more recently in an interview in March of 2012 with TOLOnews, stating that it is imperative that NATO “report to the [UN] Security Council that the mandate has been fulfilled,” saying that it is illogical for NATO to begin making plans to withdraw now.8 “I don’t think the job has been done,” he responded when asked if he felt that the goals of the American-led mission in Afghanistan had been met. “It’s clear that trouble continues in Afghanistan and terrorist attacks do not subsided. [sic]”9 According to a Russian Foreign Ministry press release dated 5 April 2012, Afghanistan is a major topic of discussion at an upcoming meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Astana. The issue of peacekeeping capabilities is also a major point on the agenda of the meeting, suggesting that the Russian government is perhaps preparing for a near-future scenario where they will have to commit troops to preserving stability in the region with the absence of NATO forces.
The Russian government, while urging NATO forces to not leave the region prematurely, has also been vocal in declaring NATO efforts to curb drug production and trafficking as ineffective. About 25% of all heroin produced in Afghanistan travels through Russia and into Europe. Additionally, roughly 10% of Afghanistan’s gross economic output is estimated to be from opium poppy cultivation.10 Russia, however, does cooperate with NATO and US efforts in fighting narcotics trafficking in the region, and a joint US-Russia task force exists for that specific purpose. Even so, it is within Russia’s long-term interests to continue hounding NATO on its lackluster performance in fighting the narcotics trade: considering the Taliban makes much of its revenue from drug trafficking, Russia can use the continuing drug problem in Afghanistan as political leverage to assert that the NATO mission in Afghanistan is incomplete and the mandate unfulfilled.
Although Russia cooperates with NATO and ISAF loosely on Afghanistan, its ultimate policy goal is, as always, different. In 2010, Mr. Rogozin announced in his duties as Ambassador to NATO that Afghanistan, following the eventual withdrawal of coalition forces, should be a “neutral state.” The statement coincided with talk about a possible premature withdrawal due to the leak of 90,000 classified documents by the website WikiLeaks.11 As mentioned, the Russian government chafes at the idea of its sphere of influence eroding. Considering the proximity to Russia of Afghanistan, a stable and independent Afghanistan would, for the Russians, ideally be “neutral” (but preferably, for Moscow, slant towards the Russian side of the table). It shows that despite cooperation and similar goals, the Russians still, as always, have a not-so-hidden agenda of their own.
Endnotes
1Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Response of A.K. Lukashevich, Official Representative of MFA of Russia, to Media Question Regarding Schemes of Transit of NATO Cargos from Afghanistan through Russian Territory,” 15 Mar 2012
3Russian MFA, “Information and Press Department of MFA of Russia Comments upon Kirghiz Mass Media Publications on Procedure of NATO Cargo Transit from Afghanistan Through Ulyanovsk Airport,” 22 March 2012
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