[The following is my mid term which I wrote for HIST 284, a course on the Arab/Israeli conflict, dealing with three documents which shaped the foundation of the modern state of Israel and the current situation.]
The territory of Palestine, and the modern state of Israel which resides within its borders, traces its scarred, bloody lineage directly to the imperial ambitions of western Europe of the prewar era. At first dominated by the Turks, the fate of Palestine was ultimately to be determined by parties far removed from the ground, and from the people. As the Ottoman Empire met its waning hours, the major powers of Europe moved forward to carve up the remnants among themselves, and to claim their spheres of influence in the Middle East. Three documents in particular were created by that power which ascended to the position of Palestine’s imperial keeper, Great Britain: one during the latter stages of WWI, the secretive Sykes-Picot Agreement; one during the closing months of the war, the (in)famous Balfour Declaration; and one during the late interbellum period, the White Paper of 1939. Each of the three documents played a role, some more notably than others, in the development of the current situation within the modern Israeli state. While some aspects of the three were interrelated, other differences are made especially apparent when considering the documents’ varying purposes, authors, and influences. However, their differences notwithstanding, these three documents intertwined to shape the current rift between the Islamic and Jewish populations of Palestine. Through studying and analyzing the three, it becomes possible to partially understand a few of the countless factors which contributed to the current status quo in Palestine.
The first of the three documents, the secretive Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, was convened by the British and French governments during the First World War to carve up the Middle East into spheres of influence in the aftermath of the expected fall of the Ottoman Empire. The talks for Sykes-Picot began in November 1915: France was represented by François Georges-Picot; the British by Sir Mark Sykes. Picot demanded the area the French defined as “Syria” for an area of French interest and influence: in reality modern day Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Northern Iraq, and part of Anatolia (Morris 70). Sykes, meanwhile, pursued British interests in Palestine, Jordan, and Mesopotamia. By January of 1916, the two were able to iron out an agreement where both parties were granted roughly what they wanted: Britain’s sphere of influence lay in the south, consisting of most of modern day Iraq and of parts of Palestine, while France’s area consisted of the north with much of what they had originally referred to as “Syria.” A joint zone was developed within the majority of Palestine, specifically Gaza, which was to be administered jointly by the French-British Allied forces (Morris 70-71). While mostly wishful thinking towards the not-long-off destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the agreement had real ramifications for Palestine as it cemented British interests in the region, namely the Suez Canal and the Anglo trade routes it facilitated (specifically to India). The divisions outlined by Sykes-Picot also assisted in the establishment of the various postwar League of Nations Mandates, however Britain’s scrapping of Sykes-Picot, due in no small part to its near unilateral victory over the Ottoman Empire on the eastern front, saw France excluded from much of the territory it was originally granted. In particular, Britain took total dominion over Palestine and Gaza, and was able to completely exclude France from the originally planned joint-control zone (Morris 88). Sykes-Picot had additional ramifications for the future of Arab-western relations, however: concurrently with the formation of Sykes-Picot, Britain had promised Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, an Arab Empire in return for his assistance against the Ottomans. The nature of Sykes-Picot undermined this promise, as Britain would be unable to fulfill both agreements (Shlaim 7). These two were not the only wartime promises Britain would be unable to fulfill, however, as November 1917 brought perhaps one of the most important documents contributing to the current state of affairs in the state of Israel in the present day.
Chaim Weizmann, born in Russia and later emigrated to London, became one of the most notable leaders of the Zionist movement in the United Kingdom. He became noteworthy in many of the inner circles of His Majesty’s Government for his contributions in the field of artillery shell manufacture, which was especially helpful to the Allied war effort. By 1920, he had been elected president of the World Zionist Organization (Shlaim 6). The former was the cause; the latter the effect of his influence in crafting the “Balfour Declaration” of 1917, which was to become one of the single most important documents to the Zionist cause. The Balfour Declaration, a letter issued by the British government stating support for the establishment of a “Jewish Home” in Palestine, found its roots, ironically, in a similar declaration issued by the French Quay d’Orsay not five months earlier. At this time, the Zionist organization had offices with both the Allied and Central Powers, effectively making itself neutral. The French were convinced by one Nahum Sokolow, a Russian Zionist who would later play a crucial role alongside Weizmann in the creation of the Balfour Declaration, to open themselves up to the Zionist cause in an attempt to preempt the Germans in making a similar declaration (Morris 73-74). Weizmann was soon able to convince the British to follow the French lead, playing upon British trade interests in the region: the same interests which had factored into the creation of Sykes-Picot. Weizmann was able to convince the British government that a Jewish commonwealth would be a valuable asset to the British Empire; an allied state so near the Suez would be a major help in securing trade routes. Weizmann’s own interests were quite obvious as well: if the Zionists were to achieve their goal of international recognition, no nation could thrust the Zionist cause to the forefront of the world stage better than the preeminent world power of the time: the British Empire (Shlaim 6-7). During the negotiations to develop the Declaration, there were three parties which participated: the British government, the Zionists, and non-Zionist British Jews. Each of the three parties had specific objectives they sought to establish and defend. The British government was primarily concerned with winning the war, and sought support from any and all parties it could. The Zionists (led by Weizmann and Sokolow), meanwhile, sought international recognition for their cause: a Jewish state in Palestine. The non-Zionist Jews (represented by Edwin Montagu and Claude Montefiore), however, had other interests: the preservation of the rights of Jews elsewhere, besides within a proposed Jewish homeland in Palestine (Mallison 66-67).
The declaration underwent six drafts, before a finalized version was approved to be published by Balfour’s Foreign Office. The Foreign Office created a first draft, which outlined the creation of a refuge and sanctuary for oppressed Jewish populations in Palestine. The Zionists found the language of the first draft to be insufficient, and set out to create a draft of their own. In the Zionists’ early draft, they were quick to list their demands almost in full: the draft first used the term “National Home” to describe the Zionists’ desired status within Palestine, and further established “Jewish internal autonomy” and “unlimited immigration.” Both Balfour and Sokolow had their reservations with this draft, and Sokolow soon returned with a draft he felt was more concise and fitting for the cause, which outlined two specific principles: (1) the recognition of Palestine as the Jewish national home and (2) the recognition of the Zionist Organization (Mallison 71-72). Balfour returned in kind with what is referred to as a “slightly revised version” of the Zionist Draft, showing de facto approval for the Zionist objectives by the foreign minister. It was understood, however, that such a clear acceptance of Zionist motives would not find itself in the rest of the Cabinet’s good graces. It was therefore left to Lord Alfred Milner to prepare a draft to present to the Cabinet. Milner’s draft was less explicit in its support of Zionism, but even so the non-Zionist (soon to become anti-Zionist) Jews were slow to accept even a watered down version of the Balfour draft. Montagu, the only Jewish member of the Cabinet, railed against the proposal, supporting the interests of the local Christian and Muslim populations against the prospect of being replaced by implanted Jews (Mallison 73-75). The Zionists were quick to counter, as Weizmann and Mark Sykes, the previous architect of Sykes-Picot, drafted a memorandum which retreated further from previous Zionist objectives: rather than a Jewish “republic” or “commonwealth” in Palestine, they would instead seek recognition as a “national unit” which would be “federated” with the other, local populations (Mallison 76). The resulting Milner-Amery draft included the two safeguard clauses which protected Jews abroad and the local Palestinian populations which would have otherwise been supplanted by the influx of Jews (Mallison 77-80).
The Milner-Amery draft evolved into the final draft which was then approved and published by His Majesty’s Government. While numerous concessions had been made for the non/anti-Zionist Jews, the declaration was still hailed as a victory for Zionists. The declaration served as one of the founding documents of the Zionist push for statehood in Palestine, and while such a reference had been specifically omitted from the text of the declaration, Balfour himself said that he hoped “the Jews will make good in Palestine and eventually found a Jewish State.” He referred to the declaration as their “great opportunity (Morris 75).” While the Balfour Declaration was a victory for the Zionists, it would also serve some British interests. Much of the spirit of the declaration would be incorporated into the later mandate, specifically articles 2, 4, 6, 7, 11, and 22. These articles related to the obligation of the mandatory power to “foster and support” the development of a Jewish nation in Palestine, which gave the British cause (and imperial ambitions) in Palestine legitimacy. This obviously also assisted the Jews, whose national institutions would be shaped and tailored by the British during the mandatory period (Khalidi 32). The long term effects of Balfour have been far reaching on the status quo of the conflict in contemporary times, and are reflected by many Zionists’ assertion that the Balfour Declaration was an official recognition of Zionism as a movement, and that it was a blessing by the British Empire for the eventual establishment of a Jewish state.
The final of the three documents, which played less of a crucial role in the actual establishment of Israel and more of a role as a catalyst for the eventual independence and formation of Israel, was the White Paper of 1939. The White Paper of 1939, also known as the MacDonald White Paper for the Minister who presided over it, was published and accepted under the Chamberlain Ministry, and represented a nearly complete about-face in British policy regarding Palestine. The White Paper was the product of the intense fighting and revolt which had been ongoing in Palestine between 1936 and 1939, and was an attempt by Whitehall to appease the Arabs with political concessions in an attempt to keep native populations elsewhere complacent (Morris 156-157). The British set out to appease the Arabs’ demands in 1939 (a policy Chamberlain’s government was already somewhat famous for) by essentially limiting the amount of support they would lend to the Jews and increasing the political rights and protections of Arab populations. A cap of 75,000 in five years was proposed for Jewish immigration. Additionally, Jews were forbidden from purchasing land in certain districts, and it was also proposed that an Arab-majority rule state be established within ten years’ time (Morris 158). The White Paper of 1939 effectively negated the previous findings of the Peel Commission, which had suggested separate states for Jews and Arabs in Palestine. While its publishing was not entirely unexpected, as it was the product of policy and events during the interwar years which saw increased Arab militancy, many within the Zionist community, especially Weizmann, felt bitter about the change in policy (Shlaim 10). The revisionist Zionist community, led by Ze’ev Jabotinsky, embarked on a campaign of anti-British terrorism in response to the new limits placed on the Yishuv, which laid the seeds for the eventual severance of the Jewish community in Palestine from the British as the mandate crumbled (Morris 161). The White Paper of 1939 was originally meant to benefit the Arab peoples of Palestine, but in this way it was also inadequate. Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was especially vociferous in his opposition to the White Paper, which revealed the deep divisions within Palestinian society and the failings of the Palestinians’ national institutions to unite them in the face of certain subjugation. While initially cooperative with the British, the mufti gradually changed his outlook as talks with the British dissolved, and he eventually openly denounced the White Paper, aligning himself with the younger, more militant sects of Palestinian society who had previously criticized him for collaborating with the British. The mufti demanded full independence for Palestine, but at this point he was ignored by the British, who largely blamed him for the revolts between 1936 and 1939 (Khalidi 115-117). The unwillingness of the Arabs to compromise, combined with the resistance to the limits imposed upon the Yishuv by the Zionists, resulted in the White Paper of 1939 contributing greatly to the current situation in the Arab/Israeli conflict: the White Paper caused a rift to form between the British and Yishuv, and caused the rift between the Palestinians and Yishuv to deepen further.
These three documents hold special significance in the history of Palestine/Israel as being primary catalysts for major events which shaped the current structure of the situation today. Each had their own beneficiaries, actual or intended, and each also had their own specific purposes. They intertwine in the sense that their effects built upon one another up until the establishment of the state of Israel: for Sykes-Picot, the agreement established Britain’s interests and eventual dominance in Palestine and the Middle East at large. For the Balfour Declaration, Britain’s imperial interests in the region were furthered with the prospect of an allied Jewish state to safeguard trade lines to India. Somewhat in contrast, the White Paper of 1939 represented an about-face in British policy, as Chamberlain’s Ministry attempted to undo both what it may have perceived as “moral wrongs” and what it knew as political and societal instability, as the Arab revolts against Jewish settlement had gained Britain’s attention with the potential of throwing other colonial possessions into chaos. The White Paper failed in that regard, however, as it delayed the inevitable: Zionist resistance, both covert and overt, ensured the survival of the Yishuv, and Palestinian disjointedness ensured a unified Arab state in Palestine would remain an impossibility, even with British support. The inevitable, of course, was the establishment of a Jewish state in 1948, and the war and conflict which surrounded the circumstance. Sykes-Picot opened the door to Jewish statehood, the Balfour Declaration gave the Zionists the means to do it; The White Paper of 1939 gave them a cause célèbre to pursue it.
Works Cited
Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Beacon Pr, 2007.
Mallison, W.T. “The Balfour Declaration: An Appraisal in International Law”. The Transformation of Palestine. Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim, ed. Northwestern University Press, 1971.
Morris, Benny. Righteous victims: a history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881-2001. Vintage, 2001.
Shlaim, Avi. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.
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