The United States and the Hungarian Revolution: The Death of Rollback

[Apologies for the endnotes being Roman numerals, but they auto-converted when copied from the original text.]

The year 1956 was a tumultuous year on the international stage, but this proves particularly true when studying United States foreign policy at the time. It was a year of many unknowns for the United States, as while the Cold War had already gained momentum in the wake of the Korean War, U.S. policy was still in its developing stages for coping with the new postwar order. The Eisenhower administration had the legacy of Truman’s eponymous doctrine to work with, however questions still lingered over how that doctrine, that the United States would support any nation being threatened with takeover by an armed minority (implicitly meant to refer to Communists), would be implemented. Although the Truman Doctrine was initially a major step towards containment policy, as espoused by George Kennan in his 1946 Long Telegram,ⁱ in 1956 the policy of rollback was still popular in many Washington circles. Rollback was popularized within the United States government by NSC-68, a document published in 1950 by the National Security Council that called for unprecedented peacetime military spending and an increasingly coercive and confrontational attitude towards the Soviets.ⁱⁱ Rollback was essentially the policy of pressuring the Soviets out of Eastern Europe, possibly through military means, and, in effect, liberating the nations that had previously been “liberated” by the Soviets at the end of the Second World War. At the time of its writing, NSC-68 speculated on the development of Soviet thermonuclear capabilities;ⁱⁱⁱ by 1955, however, the Soviets had tested their first air-dropped thermonuclear weapon, and had bombers capable of reaching American targets.^iv This complicated matters significantly for American strategic planning and diplomatic policy, and made rollback appear increasingly less likely. In 1956, the United States had a tenuous, but stable, relationship with the Soviet Union. Stalin’s death in 1953 had opened inroads for an understanding to be reestablished between East and West, and by February 1956 the Soviet leadership officially renounced expectations of “imminent war” with the West.^v Khrushchev had worked to consolidate his power in the wake of Stalin’s demise, and had reoriented the Soviet Union through his de-Stalinization efforts such that it appeared peaceful coexistence between the two superpowers would be, in some way, possible. Six months after the renunciation of Stalin’s long-standing paranoia, however, came a shock that terrorized the Soviet leadership, and left the Eisenhower administration stunned: on October 23, 1956, the powder keg that had been simmering in Hungary exploded with incredible ferocity. What had started during the day as mass student demonstrations quickly spread throughout Budapest, and escalated between eight or nine o’clock that night into open combat in front of the state broadcasting headquarters.^vi What ensued was a period of tension between the Soviets and Americans, and the events that transpired in Budapest sent shock waves through both Moscow and Washington. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 came at a pivotal point in time in the United States-Soviet relationship, and it had a lasting impact on the United States’ relationship with the Soviet Union and its satellites, particularly in the development of containment policy and the abandonment of rollback and liberation as strategic goals.

There are several factors that contributed to the ferocity of the Hungarian Revolution, but there are two factors which stand out considerably from the myriad of background influences. The first was the repressive rule of Hungary’s “Little Stalin,” Matyas Rakosi, which was characterized by purges^vii and economic instability and stagnation.^viii The second, in the immediate run-up to the outbreak of fighting in Hungary, was the appointment of a reformist in Poland, Wladyslaw Gomulka, as the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party. Gomulka was able to negotiate a troop reduction agreement with the Soviets, which emboldened Hungarians who were resentful of the continued military occupation of their nation by the Red Army.^ix Following the death of Stalin, and with the support of the Soviet Presidium, Imre Nagy, a moderate reformist, was appointed Premier in Hungary on July 4, 1953; early in his tenure Nagy introduced numerous changes to the country’s economic system.^x Rakosi, however, maintained his post at the head of the Party, and the two clashed frequently.^xi Rakosi was eventually able to win back the favor of the Soviet Presidium, which put Nagy’s liberal tendencies under intense scrutiny by Moscow. Nagy suffered a minor heart attack, attributed to stress, in January 1955, effectively removing him from his capacity as Premier.^xii Nagy was expelled from the Hungarian Politburo and Central Committee three months later.^xiii Nagy, however, would be redeemed. Khrushchev’s address to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the so-called “Secret Speech,” in February 1956, although not published in the Eastern bloc, denounced Stalinism and the “cult of personality.”^xiv Rakosi, as a pupil of Stalin, was in trouble. After months of internal conflict, mainly between the intelligentsia and Rakosi’s Stalinist Politburo, Rakosi was dismissed from his post at Khrushchev’s request on July 18, 1956. Erno Gero, a close associate of Rakosi’s, replaced him as General Secretary.^xv The buildup of discontent centered around the character of Imre Nagy, who the nation thought of as their only hope to deliver them from the repression of the current government. When news of the reinstatement of Gomulka in Warsaw reached Budapest, the Hungarians immediately wondered: “why can the same not happen here?” The shakeup of the Hungarian Communists’ leadership, as well as the installation of a liberal-leaning government in Poland, gave the Hungarians the audacity to begin asking these sorts of questions.^xvi Nagy was aware of the coming storm, and when news of the demonstrations reached him at his country home on the morning of October 23, he made his way back to his villa on Orso Street in the center of Budapest. That evening, Nagy arrived at the Parliament building in Budapest where an angry mob armed with torches shouted for his reinstatement as leader. Nagy convinced the people to return to their homes peaceably, and they begrudgingly obliged him.^xvii News, however, arrived of shots being fired outside the headquarters of the state radio station. The violence quickly escalated: rebels raided state armories, and policemen and soldiers who were averse to fighting their own countrymen laid down their weapons. The rebels demanded Nagy be installed as both Premier and General Secretary of the Party. This put Nagy in a very precarious position as Moscow’s eyes were drawn to him.^xviii

The United States was keenly aware of the brooding sentiments among the Hungarian population during this period. A report was prepared in January 1956, one month prior to Khrushchev’s secret address, for U.S. Army Intelligence by Georgetown University. It examined Hungary’s suitability as a “potential theater for Special Forces operations.”^xix The report acknowledged that Hungary had widespread dissidence, with popular support of the regime estimated at less than 10% of the population in 1954. It also concluded, however, that the nature of dissidence in Hungary did not pose an immediate threat to the state’s health.^xx Passive resistance, the report asserted, was “perhaps more common in Hungary than in any other European satellite,” but there was no evidence to suggest active partisan activity or organized resistance against the Communist regime.^xxi The Georgetown report was also cognizant of the problem surrounding the youth in Hungary, who would become the driving force behind the uprising later that year. “Contrary to early predictions of Communist success in the indoctrination of youth,” it states, “the whole youth program has been far from successful, and the resistance of youth is one of the most serious problems facing the Communists.”^xxii The report attributed the lack of active, organized resistance movements and partisans to a problem of geography, which is also why it concluded that Hungary, despite its high levels of discontent and passive resistance, was not suitable for U.S. covert operations. The report stated that the nature of Hungary’s geography, as a landlocked and mostly flat nation, did not lend itself well to the execution of covert activities, as there were few places for operatives to conceal themselves.^xxiii

Mention of unrest in Hungary was again raised in American foreign policy circles days before Rakosi’s dismissal as Premier in July 1956. On July 12, the National Security Council met to create a new draft policy statement toward Eastern Europe: NSC-5608. In the minutes to the meeting, Vice President Nixon is quoted as saying that he would be “most reluctant” to follow any policy that followed George Kennan’s line that “there was essentially nothing we could do about the unhappy status quo now existing in the Soviet satellites.”^xxiv Nixon asserted that it would be a great error to use terms in the draft that would potentially discourage democratic elements in the Eastern bloc. The Vice President himself, in a sense, supported rollback, at least rhetorically, to buck the hold of the Soviet Union over its satellites. During the meeting, Nixon commented that it “wouldn’t be an unmixed evil, from the point of view of U.S. interest,” if the Soviet Union were again to come down hard on the satellites of Eastern Europe. He clarified, though, that it would be more desirable for the ongoing trend of liberalization in Soviet-satellite relations to continue.^xxv Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, younger brother to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, responded to Nixon’s mention of another possible Soviet crackdown by pointing out “indications of considerable unrest in Czechoslovakia and Hungary,” and said that U.S. attention had been diverted from these developments by the more “spectacular events” in Poznan, referring to the revolt in Poland that ultimately resulted in the re-installation of Gomulka to power in Warsaw.^xxvi The conversation at this meeting of the NSC foreshadowed the events of autumn 1956, but the U.S. intelligence community did not predict the uprising. Because it was not suitable for operations, Hungary remained largely under the radar.

It is apparent, judging by the Vice President’s comments, that, up until this point, rollback was still considered a feasible and, perhaps, a preferable option when compared to containment. In fact, when the Eisenhower administration took the reigns from Truman in 1953, statements made by the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, suggested a more aggressive American foreign policy on Eastern Europe. Dulles promised to support an “explosive and dynamic” policy of “liberation.”^xxvii The rhetoric, however, did not match the substance of the administration’s policies: in 1954, Eisenhower decided that no moment “would be right to start a war,” and asserted that the United States would only retaliate against Soviet aggression. Both Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and Secretary of State Dulles came to argue for containment, but a tension developed within U.S. foreign policy by the time the uprising of 1956 exploded. On the one hand, the United States had not changed its rhetoric, and actively encouraged the Eastern European states to break away from the Soviet hegemony. On the other hand, the United States privately refused to offer any sort of military support to states which did attempt to run the gauntlet of Soviet resolve. What resulted was a U.S. foreign policy characterized by psychological operations, inflammatory propaganda, and covert operations to disrupt Soviet control.^xxviii While the notion of rollback was popular in Washington, there was little enthusiasm for actually trying to implement it: the risk of open armed confrontation with the Soviets resulting from it was too high for the administration to seriously consider it. While the administration more or less formally rejected rollback as a viable policy in 1953 with the adoption of NSC-174,^xxix the spirit of liberation was still popular. Rather than propose forceful liberation of Eastern Europe, the Eisenhower administration continued to pursue the goals of rollback through covert means. The rhetoric associated with liberation from Dulles and other high-ranking officials continued, and it sent ambiguous messages to the populations of the Eastern bloc nations. These ambiguous messages had disastrous results in Hungary, where the people expected more support from the United States once their revolution had begun.^xxx

Because of both the affirmation from the report prepared by Georgetown that fostering a resistance movement in Hungary via covert means was untenable and the ambivalence of the Eisenhower administration towards the liberation of the Eastern European states, the United States was, in a sense, caught with its pants down when shots erupted in Budapest. American strategic planners had been completely unprepared for the possibility of armed rebellion and street fighting against the regime, and the ferocity of the rebellion quickly caught Moscow’s attention. On the night of the outbreak, the Soviet Presidium held an emergency meeting. Marshal Georgy Zhukov, then Soviet Minister of Defense, delivered the following assessment of the situation in Hungary: “A demonstration by 100 thous. in Budapest; the radio station is on fire.” All members of the Presidium except Anastas Mikoyan, Minister of Foreign Trade, approved of Khrushchev’s suggestion to send troops to put down the uprising.^xxxi The next day, on October 24, Soviet tanks were blockading the streets of Budapest.^xxxii Eisenhower was quick to denounce Soviet intervention, and he expressed sympathy for the Hungarian people. On October 26, the NSC was convened to formulate a strategy to forestall a major Soviet crackdown. The U.S. decided to attempt to negotiate a settlement, knowing that its own options were limited. The arrangement called for a neutral state, along the lines of Austria or Finland, to be established in Hungary.^xxxiii From the start, Eisenhower ruled out military intervention in support of the rebels, and even ruled out a CIA proposal to covertly drop arms and supplies into Hungary.^xxxiv American officials, along with the British and French, had brought the issue before the United Nations Security Council on October 28. On October 29, however, much to the dismay of the American government, hostilities broke out on the Sinai peninsula at Suez. The British and French joined the conflict, to the chagrin of the Americans, on October 31, and moved for the issue of Hungary to be presented to a special session of the UN General Assembly which would cover both crises.^xxxv The Americans blocked their efforts, however, and both crises remained on the Security Council’s agenda.

The U.S. was confident that its negotiation strategy was proving successful: on October 30, Marshal Zhukov spoke in favor of withdrawing Soviet troops from Hungary.^xxxvi Convinced that the threat of a Soviet crackdown was averted, the Eisenhower administration focused on the pressing Suez Crisis. French and British actions behind the scenes of Suez had infuriated Dulles: “Just when the Soviet orbit was crumbling and we could point to a contrast between the Western world and the Soviets, it appeared the West was producing a similar situation.”^xxxvii On November 1, just as the focus was shifting towards Suez, the Soviets reversed their previous decision. Negotiations between the Soviets and Nagy had proven fruitful, and an agreement had been reached both for the independence of Hungary and the removal of Soviet troops, as encouraged by the United States.^xxxviii The Soviets, however, reversed this agreement days later, just as life was returning to normal in Budapest. The Soviets were concerned that, if the Hungarians were to leave the Warsaw Pact, as Nagy intended, what would keep the Czechs or Poles in line?^xxxix Nagy had essentially forced the Soviets’ hand, and on November 4, 1956, the second Soviet intervention began. The first intervention had been relatively small, and was carried out by troops already stationed in Hungary; the second was an outright invasion.^xl With a flick of its paw, the Russian bear was able to crush the revolution and install a new regime under Janos Kadar.

Throughout the crisis, American rhetoric had encouraged the Hungarian rebels to continue fighting for their freedom. This was the tragic side effect of America’s “liberation” propaganda: while the U.S. government assured the world that it was committed to the goal of an independent Central and Eastern Europe, it did not publicly advertise the fact that it was not committed enough to risk a military engagement with the Soviets. The rhetoric, however, convinced the fighters on the ground otherwise.^xli The crisis, as it developed prior to the second Soviet intervention, was in some ways exacerbated by Western influences such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, which delivered messages of encouragement to the fighters. A survey of fleeing refugees in 1957 indicated that one-half of U.S.-bound refugees expected American intervention on behalf of the rebels because of the content broadcast over the radio.^xlii American officials, however, were well aware of the fact that the Hungarians, without some sort of cease-fire or compromise, were fighting a suicidal battle. No effort was made to suggest to the Hungarians that Dulles felt they did not have a chance; even after the second invasion on November 4, the RFE and VOA broadcasts urged the rebels forward.^xliii

After the Soviet invasion on November 4, American diplomatic circles still did not yet count themselves out of the Hungarian crisis. A telegram from the American Ambassdor to Italy, Clare Boothe Luce, was forwarded through the U.S. Embassy in Paris to President Eisenhower. In it, Luce made a passionate plea for Eisenhower to make some sort of public move in support of the Hungarians, making the following comparison: “Franco-British action on Suez is a small wound to their prestige but American inaction about Hungary could be a fatal wound to ours.”^xliv In a move mirroring the previous attempt by the French and British, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge unilaterally submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly to condemn the Soviet actions in Hungary, thus circumventing the Soviet veto on the Security Council.^xlv By this time, however, the Suez crisis had put the United States in a remarkably awkward position. Richard Nixon explained after the conflict: “We couldn’t, on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and the French picking that particular time to intervene against Nasser.”^xlvi Eisenhower very boldly ordered the French, British, and Israelis to withdraw from Egypt, both to distance the United States from a blatant imperial power-play and to try to refocus world attention on Hungary.^xlvii He also had to prevent the Soviets from threatening intervention in the Middle East, and to do so he invoked the Soviet invasion of Hungary. On November 5, the Soviets offered that the United States and Soviet Union join forces to put an end to the Suez Crisis. The implied threat in the rejection of this scheme, which the Soviets surely expected, was unilateral intervention by the Soviets.^xlviii Eisenhower instead issued a public statement that asked the states of the Middle East: “Do you want the Soviets in the Middle East doing what they are now doing in Hungary?” The statement committed the United States to maintaining the United Nations mandate, and implicitly threatened the Soviets that any unilateral action over Suez would not be tolerated. That evening he asked for a preliminary consultation with congressional leaders in case he was forced to ask Congress for a declaration of war, and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was put on full alert.^xlix This all occurred on the eve of the 1956 U.S. Presidential election; the Hungarian Revolution was effectively crushed, but tensions had reached a record high. On November 7, amid Eisenhower’s landslide victory in the election, a cease-fire in Suez was declared, and fears of Soviet intervention began to fade.^l The UN General Assembly had voted to issue ultimatums to both the Soviets in Hungary and the combatants in Egypt; only in the latter case did the involved parties heed the will of the UN.

Ultimately, the revolution in Hungary was crushed wholly under the Soviet jackboot in an unprecedented display of force. Not since the Second World War had the Red Army’s fury been unleashed in such a monstrous display; at the peak of the invasion on November 4, over 200,000 Soviet troops and 4,000 tanks were streaming into Hungary.^li The United States was ultimately powerless to stop the onslaught with force, considering it lacked sufficient conventional forces in Eastern Europe, as well as the means to transfer said forces to Hungary without violating either Czechoslovak territory or Austrian neutrality. Additionally, Eisenhower was, wisely, unwilling to risk a military confrontation with the Soviets, especially a nuclear exchange. The remarkable violence which the Soviets used to suppress the uprising showed the United States firsthand the lengths that the Soviet Union would go to preserve its hegemony in Eastern Europe. This realization, combined with Eisenhower’s ultimate inaction in Hungary, effectively hammered the last nail in the coffin of rollback doctrine: the doctrine of liberation proved to be a “deadly sham.”^lii Although actual military intervention had been ruled out from the start, liberation of the Eastern European states was abandoned as an ultimate strategic goal. The invasion of Hungary by the Soviet Union, and the refusal of the West to involve itself more heavily beyond rhetoric, also caused many to come to the realization that, despite common illusions, a system of Eastern and Western spheres of interest, based on the acceptance of a post-war settlement, did exist, and was in practice.^liii While the Suez Crisis threatened the cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance, the brutality of the Soviet response also legitimized the need for it. NATO was founded to counter Soviet aggression in Europe, and while Hungary was, ostensibly, already within the Soviet sphere of influence, the Soviet assault was the realization of the aggression that NATO feared. The Soviet Presidium acknowledged this: Matvei Saburov reminded his colleagues during the deliberations to renew the assault on Hungary that action against the rebellion would “vindicate NATO.”^liv It became obvious to the NATO powers that the Soviets would not be leaving Europe anytime soon, and that significant changes in Eastern European regimes were contingent upon significant changes within the Soviet ruling establishment. This would prove true come 1989, when Gorbachev’s release of the satellites resulted in the fall of each of their Communist governments. Until that time, however, the United States used the lessons it learned in 1956 to commit itself to implementing containment worldwide. The invasion of Hungary confirmed that the Soviet threat to Europe was real, and fundamentally changed the outlook of the United States when encouraging dissidence in Soviet satellites. From 1956 onward, the United States was consciously aware of the violence the Soviets were willing to perpetrate as the memories of Hungary lingered on the West’s conscience.

 

i Robert Griffith and Paula Baker, Major Problems in American History Since 1945 (Boston: Wadsworth, 2007), 39-42

ii Ibid., 51-54

iii Ibid., 52

iv John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 68

v Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 94

vi Paul Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 239-240

vii Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 18-19

viii Ibid., 40

ix Ibid., 142-143

x Tibor Meray, Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin, trans. Howard Katzander(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959), 17

x iIbid., 21

xii Ibid., 28-29

xiii Ibid., 32

xiv Zinner, 203

xv Ibid., 214-215

xvi Meray, 60-61

xvii Ibid., 80-82

xviii Ibid., 87-91

xix Hungary: Resistance Activities and Potentials, Project No. 9570, prepared by Georgetown University, 5 January 1956, 3
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/doc1.pdf&gt;

xx Ibid., 5

xxi Ibid., 4

xxii Ibid., 11

xxiii Ibid., 23-24

xxiv Minutes of 290^th NSC meeting, July 12, 1956, 12 July 1956, 2
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/doc2.pdf&gt;

xxv Ibid., 4

xxvi Ibid., 4

xxvii Laszlo Borhi, “Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction? U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s,” Journal of Cold War Studies, no. 1.3(1999), 88-89

xxviii Ibid., 69-71

xxix Ibid., 89

xxx Ibid., 90

xxxi Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 23 October 1956, 23 October 1956, Wilson Center Cold War International History Project, 1956 Hungarian Revolution Collection

xxxii Meray, 96-98

xxxiii Borhi, 98-100

xxxiv John Patrick Diggins, The Proud Decades (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 302

xxxv Csaba Bekes, “The Hungarian Question on the UN Agenda,” Hungarian Quarterly (Spring 2000)

xxxvi Borhi, 100

xxxvii Ibid., 101

xxxviii Meray, 160-161

xxxix Ibid., 198-199

xl Ibid., 236-237

xli Ibid., 115-116

xlii Borhi, 81

xliii Ibid., 109

xliv Clare Boothe Luce, Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, 4 November 1956
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v25/d165&gt;

xlv Csaba Bekes, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics,” Wilson Center CWIHP Working Paper No. 16, 23
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB4E.pdf&gt;

xlvi Borhi, 105

xlvii Wm. Roger Louis, “Dulles, Suez, and the British,” John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Richard Immerman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 135

xlviii David A. Nichols, Eisenhower 1956 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 245

xlix Ibid., 246

l Ibid., 258-289

li Ibid., 239

lii Diggins, 302

liii Bekes (CWIHP), 6

liv Zubok, 117

Reversing a Century of Law

[Written for my second semester American Politics regarding the landmark decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It’s a short but sweet analysis drawn from a couple different news sources.]

On Thursday, 21 January of this year, the Supreme Court decided in favor of Citizens United in the case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, causing an about face in the laws which have governed elections for over a century. The decision, which saw a narrow vote of five to four, has been among the most controversial news topics of recent weeks, and has garnered much criticism from varying ends of the political spectrum. Perhaps among the most notable of the decision’s critics is President Obama, who has openly declared his opposition to the court’s opinion on numerous occasions; prime among them his referencing the decision in his first State of the Union address.

Justice Kennedy’s opinion made reference to the statutes and precedents the court’s decision overturned, and specifically pointed out in his opening that, in this case, the court was asked to reexamine McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and the earlier Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, as well as 2 U. S. C. §441b. The former two cases, taking place in 2003 and 1990 respectively (Cornell Citizens United), had dealt with campaign finance law and the ability of the complaining parties to contribute to independent media campaigns (that is, media campaigns promoted by third parties aside from the candidate him or herself). These two decisions went alongside Section 441b of Title 2 of the US Code, and upheld the law which defined limitations on these sorts of contributions (Cornell US Code). The majority upheld, and Justice Kennedy outlined in the opinion, that these previous decisions and statutes violated the first amendment in limiting the funds that entities could contribute to independent campaign efforts based upon their corporate identities (Cornell Citizens United).

As the National Journal’s Eliza Carney is quick to point out, however, this reversal in campaign finance law is not as extensive as some people seem to believe, specifically because of the “independent media campaigns” outlined above: “Second, the court’s dramatic reversal does not threaten the existing ban on direct corporate and union campaign contributions,” she explains, “So while those players may now lavish money from their treasuries on independent campaign expenditures, they still may not donate directly to candidates.” Eliza’s criticism extends further, as she outlines later her fears of undue corporate and union influence in elections (Carney). The editorial voice of the Wall Street Journal, however, stands in stark disagreement with Ms. Carney’s analysis of the situation. “Freedom has had its best week in many years. On Tuesday, Massachusetts put a Senate check on a reckless Congress,” it starts, referencing Scott Brown’s ascent to the Kennedy throne, “and yesterday the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision supporting free political speech by overturning some of Congress’s more intrusive limits on election spending.” The editorial continues mainly in supporting the decision for its Constitutional roots, and it optimistically opines that someday the Court may overturn further restrictions on corporate and other donations (Wall Street Journal).

Of course, these examples of opposition and support, respectively, are commonplace. Unique is the opinion of the decision’s biggest detractor: President Obama. As the BBC reported on the day of the decision, President Obama was quoted as saying it was a major victory for his usual nemeses: “…big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans (BBC News).” Obama also used his weekly radio address to assault Citizens United, going so far as to use inflamed rhetoric that the ruling “strikes at our democracy itself (Burnes).” Of course, these statements pale in comparison to his reference to Citizens United on the 27^th of January during the State of the Union. The President declared that the decision was a massive mistake, that it would “open the floodgates,” and that it had reversed “a century of law (Toobin).” Obama’s statement, placing him among the decision’s largest detractors, drew a reaction from one the the decision’s largest supporters: Justice Alito. Alito’s reaction to the President’s declaration hardly went unnoticed, and became a major headline overnight as cameras caught Alito giving a reaction most commentators thought unbecoming of a justice: Alito was seen sitting amongst his fellow justices shaking his head, and while audio could not be heard, his lips clearly declared: “Not true, not true.” Alito’s reaction stands in contrast to the image often portrayed of the Supreme Court justice: stately, reserved; above the political machinations of the District. This contrast is where much of the controversy over his reaction stems (Toobin). President Obama, however, has received much the same criticism in addition to that from Alito over his blatant snipe at the court. As The Washington Post reports, numerous legal experts have published opinions on both the decision itself and the ensuing debate. The Post quotes Lucas Powe, an expert on the Court from the University of Texas law school: “I can’t ever recall a president taking a swipe at the Supreme Court like that.” The closest example Powe was able to cite was a comment made by FDR during his 1937 address to Congress (Barnes).

Some legal experts, according to the same Washington Post article, are now calling into question future relations between the Court and the executive branch. The article cites the Court’s seemingly forced appearance at such events as the State of the Union: a cadre of black-clad stoics who are meant to be seen as immune to the partisan, boisterous crowd surrounding it. Add to this such high officers of state as the President attacking the Court’s decision, and some validity is added to the idea that Powe puts forth: “I do not expect to see justices at the next State of the Union address (Barnes).” No matter what these events formulate into further down the road, it is almost certain that the relationship between the executive and judicial branches will fundamentally change. Whether or not this means the Court will not attend the next Address is left in question, and that question will not be answered for nearly a year.

Works Cited

Barnes, Robert. “Reactions split on Obama’s remark, Alito’s response at State of the Union.” The Washington Post. 29 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2010/01/28/AR2010012802893.html?sid=ST2010012803706>.

Burnes, Judith. “Obama Assails Supreme Court Ruling On Political Advertising.” Wall Street Journal. 23 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100123- 700221.html>.

Carney, Eliza. “Court Unlikely To Stop With Citizens United.” National Journal Online. 21 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/rg_20100121_2456.php&gt;.

Toobin, Jeffrey. “Alito’s Face.” The New Yorker. 28 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2010/01/alitos-face.html&gt;.

“CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N.” Cornell University Law School. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-205.ZO.html&gt;.

“A Free Speech Landmark.” Wall Street Journal. 22 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703699204575016843479815072.html&gt;.

“US Code: Title 2, § 441b. Contributions or expenditures by national banks, corporations, or labor organizations.” Cornell University Law School. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/2/441b.html&gt;.

“US Supreme Court overturns campaign spending limit.” BBC News. 21 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8473253.stm&gt;.

Locke and the Second Treatise of Civil Government

[Written for my Euro History class, this analysis struck a nerve with me since Locke is arguably my greatest political influence. I’m actually pretty damn proud of this one.]

…

Arguably among John Locke’s most important and influential works, the Second Treatise of Civil Government is an analytical work regarding the purposes and functions of government, as well as how it operates with regard to society at large. Published in 1689, the Second Treatise is a compilation of Locke’s own beliefs regarding government and its various aspects. Ordered into nineteen chapters, and further subdivided into a total of two-hundred forty-three sections, Locke’s work begins with several fundamental concepts key to his philosophy, then outlines the purposes and limits of both government and civil society, and finally describes the two entities’ relationships therein. The work, however, is written by Locke in such a way that is meant to be simple to understand and easy to grasp. Locke does not rely on rhetoric to promote his arguments, and instead relies upon the arguments by themselves and his logical and philosophical justifications for them. In the preface to his Second Treatise, Locke himself states that “cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little incident of my discourse, is not an answer to my book” and that “I shall not take railing for arguments.” Locke thereby establishes Second Treatise as a work rooted in what he perceives as fact, and not in sensationalism or rhetorical arguments. To fully understand Locke’s arguments, however, one must understand his credentials and background, as well. With this knowledge, it becomes easier to understand the context within which Locke’s Second Treatise was written, and just why it has become one of the most influential works of modern political thought to date.

…

John Locke was born a lawyer’s son in August of 1632, in the town of Wrington, Somerset. Locke’s father, also named John, was a country lawyer and a Puritan man who had served in the English Civil War on the side of the Parliamentarians. It was this connection which allowed Locke an excellent education: Locke’s father’s commander in the Civil War became the local Member of Parliament, and it was through this connection that young Locke was afforded an education at Westminster School in London, which was among the most prestigious educational institutions of the time in England. Following Locke’s education at Westminster, he attended Christ Church, Oxford in 1652. It was here that Locke indulged himself in his studies, particularly in those of medicine and experimental science, both of which were outside of the standard curriculum. Locke graduated with his B.A. in 1656, and subsequently with his M.A. in 1658. Following his education, he spent a short period as a teacher at Christ Church for four years, however declined to teach further as to do so would require him to enter a holy order. It was during this time that Locke had begun reading such figures as Boyle and Descartes, the former whom Locke knew personally from his experience at Oxford. When Locke read Descartes, however, he admired the Frenchman’s outlook in contrast to the Aristotelian philosophy he had been taught at Oxford: philosophy he had found to be largely useless and sterile. His reading both Boyle and Descartes, and his working with Boyle directly, greatly solidified his interests in two fields: his admiration of Boyle solidified his interest in the natural sciences, while his admiration of Descartes solidified his interest in political and social philosophy. It was in 1666 when Locke met and became close friends with Lord Ashley, later to become 1st Earl of Shaftesbury. Locke became the Lord’s medical advisor, despite his lack of training as a physician, but moreover he became the Lord’s closest confidant and advisor in all matters. The men particularly found friendship in one another because of likeness in their political beliefs: both promoted a constitutional monarchy, both promoted civil liberties, both promoted the rule of Parliament, and both shared many other beliefs. Ashley himself was a prominent politician, and with their connection Locke was often granted a say in numerous matters of state and of personal interest to the Lord. By 1647, now Lord Shaftesbury had left government, and Locke returned to Oxford to actually pursue medicine. Locke was forced into exile, however, when Shaftesbury fell into disfavor with King Charles II. It was discovered that a number of Shaftesbury’s followers and friends had plotted an assassination attempt against the King, and under scrutiny Locke fled England for Holland where he remained until 1688. When the Glorious Revolution occurred in 1688, Locke returned to England aboard the royal yacht. It was on his return that Locke published a number of works, but most importantly, in this context, he published his Two Treatises on Civil Government. Published anonymously, the Two Treatises, particularly the Second Treatise, were an enumeration of Locke’s beliefs regarding government and the divine right of kings, which had been eliminated in England by the Glorious Revolution; it was a defense overall of the Glorious Revolution and the new King William. Locke’s later years, until his death in 1704, were spent in relative retirement, however he continued to publish works and serve in public life until 1700.

…

Considering the political climate of Locke’s England, especially upon his return in 1688, it should be no surprise regarding his previous beliefs towards constitutional government that he worked in his Second Treatise to discredit the divine right of kings. As one can see even by only skimming the chapter titles for their central themes, Locke’s work in Second Treatise postulates a society rooted in moral ideals and common principles where individuals, society at large, and the governments they create work towards maintaining order. The last of these three is paramount: it is Locke’s belief that governments are created solely by the people and to serve the people, particularly to protect the properties of individuals, and that if a government does otherwise, it has done wrong. Specifically, for instance, one can reference Section 87 of Chapter VII in how it relates man to civil society and to political society, where political society serves as an “umpire” with regard to the natural laws which exist for all men, asserted earlier in Chapter II and onwards. It is in this way that Locke balances the various aspects of society and theorizes social contract: the idea that people give up some rights to ensure the protection of others, specifically property rights as established in Chapter V. It is also through these arguments that Locke promotes the rule of law, and that if the rule of law fails to carry out its prescribed duties, then the civil government established to maintain said law has failed in its duties. Among the more notable examples of this in Locke’s text is covered in Chapter III: “Of the State of War;” it is in Section 20 of this chapter where Locke equates a miscarriage of justice to the violence of the crime which the law failed to properly prosecute. In addition, in further promoting his theory that the state is responsible to the people and that no ruler may rule without his (or her) people’s consent, the final chapter of Locke’s Second Treatise sets out the mechanisms by which a society may change its government if it fails to serve the people correctly. Chapter XIX, aptly titled “Of the Dissolution of Government,” sets forth the causes, justifications, and ideas which should “govern” the dismantling of a system of government in favor of a system which would perform in a capacity better suited to serve the people and protect their rights and liberties. It is with this chapter that Locke sets forth a map of sorts by which both current and future individuals could justify their own revolutions with, in addition to further solidifying and legitimizing the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and subsequently legitimizing the reign of the new King William.

…

Locke’s Second Treatise is, as stated, among the most influential works of modern western political thought ever published. The Second Treatise, and the other works of Locke, have inspired countless political movements and several revolutions, and perhaps most notably the ideals of Locke were embodied in the Declaration of Independence and its assertion to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” as well as subsequently being featured in the US Constitution. To read Locke’s Second Treatise directly, rather than to read about it through other means such as through interpretative essays or textbook accounts of his work, gives the reader a glimpse into Locke’s very own words and ideas. Thusly, it opens up Locke’s own work for direct interpretation, and allows the reader to observe it in context with regard to the historical circumstances surrounding it. To study the Second Treatise through reading it is to glimpse back towards the circumstances surrounding the Glorious Revolution of 1688, where for the first time in English history the dominance of Parliament was fully asserted over the power of the monarch. It was during this period of time that modern liberal thought began to develop, particularly in England where the nature of English law and government had allowed such thought to flourish in the light of healthy political discourse. Locke, as a major figure of early liberal political philosophy, laid the foundation for the rise of such prominent western powers such as the expanded British Empire and the United States of America, where his ideas and theories were incorporated into the basic compositions of these two great nations’ governments, and of their derivatives and imitators. The modern western liberal nation-state owes much of its origin to Locke’s basic philosophical ideals, for without his contributions and influence it is doubtful that such great political revolutions and changes would have occurred as extensively they did.