Top-Down Revolution: The Buildup to the Invasion of Czechoslovakia

[This is a primary-source analysis/research piece I wrote for my Cold War history class this past semester. The subject was a series of declassified Soviet communiques regarding the invasion of Czechoslovakia. I could have written much more as there were quite a few documents I didn't get a chance to cover, but I was limited to seven pages in print. I may revisit it for fun at a later date.]

January 1968 brought a breath of fresh air to the Czech and Slovak peoples as it marked the election of Alexander Dubček as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Dubček announced his intentions to move along with extensive reforms within Czechoslovakia. These reforms brought about what was to be known as the Prague Spring, where Dubček’s government attempted to implement a policy he termed as “socialism with a human face.” The ultimate intended result of the Prague Spring was to be a moderate liberalization of political life in Czechoslovakia, as well as a decentralization of power from Prague. The news was very well received with the Czechoslovak people, as well as with reformist and intellectual elements within the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Dubček, who had been seen as a compromise upon which both reformist and more orthodox party members could agree, was proving himself to be an effective force of change within Czechoslovakia. It is well known, however, how the Prague Spring ultimately ended: on an August night the armies of the Warsaw Pact surged across their borders to “help” the Czechoslovakians suppress subversive elements. The invasion resulted from a buildup of distrust and disapproval from the Soviet hegemon and her satellites: the Prague Spring was the largest threat to Soviet authority east of the Iron Curtain since the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The reality of that threat was the fact that unlike the Hungarian Revolution, the Prague Spring was a revolution from the top down: it was initiated by the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia. Because of this, it shook the legitimacy of the Soviet government along with its other satellites, which feared that liberalization in Czechoslovakia would lead to similar demands in their own nations. The buildup of tensions is apparent in a collection of declassified documents published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in its Cold War International History Project’s Digital Archive. This collection of documents, ranging from the end of February 1968 up until the autumn after the invasion, is a series of reports and correspondences, mostly from within the Ukrainian wing of the Soviet Communist Party, discussing the events in Czechoslovakia. The documents dealing with the lead up to the invasion, from February until the night of the invasion, show firsthand the paranoia exhibited on the part of the powers that were in control in the face of what they saw as a direct challenge to their authority and ability to rule.

The first of the documents, dated 28 February 1968, is a short correspondence from Petro Shelest, First Secretary of the Communist Party in the Ukrainian SSR, to the CPSU Central Committee. In it, Shelest reports that an “unknown person” who identified himself as a Czech diplomat from the consulate in Kiev, in a drunken state, struck up a conversation with two Soviet train conductors about the Soviet hockey team. He “asserted that Soviet hockey players do not know how to play and will lose again next year, all things being equal.”¹ The translator notes underneath that the hockey rivalry between the USSR and CSSR often took on a nationalistic or political overtone, as evidenced by the “diplomat’s” next statement: “…The Czechs would be better off doing business with the West than with the Soviet Union. The Soviet people have us by the neck. … You Communists are worse than the imperialists.”² The man was confirmed to be the Czechoslovak Consul-General in Kiev, Josef Gorak, who was a frequent recipient of Shelest’s criticism.

This example was only the first event which foreshadowed future troubles in Czechoslovakia’s relations with its Communist brethren, despite Dubček’s best efforts to stay in their favor. On March 18, 1968, Secretary of the Ukrainian Transcarpathian Oblast Yuri Ilnytskyi met with Jan Koscelanský, First Secretary of the KSC’s East Slovakia regional committee, one-on-one at the Ukrainian-Czechoslovak border. Koscelanský described to him the troubles within the KSC’s Central Committee, where “sharp criticism was directed against the old methods of leadership, which had given rise to a cult of Novotny.” The report explains that the Czechs under Dubček sought to establish “free” (but still single party) democracy and eliminate censorship and repression within the CSSR.³ These revelations likely alarmed the central Soviet party apparatus, whose power would have been threatened by such reforms in a neighboring Communist country. Koscelanský had to assure Ilnytskyi that it was “not a repetition of the events of 1956 in Hungary,” because the reforms were instituted by the KSC Central Committee, rather than through a popular uprising against the Party: he clarified that the masses supported the Party in instituting reforms. Koscelanský, however, also felt the need to emphasize that, “beginning with Comrade Dubček and going through every rank-and-file Communist, they will do everything possible to strengthen friendship with the Soviet Union and to advance the cause of socialism on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.”⁴ Koscelanský appeared to try to placate Soviet concerns over the reforms within his country by playing up the CSSR’s friendship with the USSR: he could doubtlessly see for himself the growing dilemma that his country was finding itself in.

Josef Gorak, meanwhile, was again immortalized in official Soviet records as he had a meeting on April 23 with B. Baklanov, Third Secretary of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. During the conversation, the Consul-General played up his relationship with Dubček, and mentioned that he (Gorak) was to take over as head of the Soviet Department in the CSSR Foreign Ministry.⁵ This likely did not bode well for the perception of Comrade Dubček in Moscow, considering Shelest’s previous report on Gorak’s drunken encounter with two train conductors. During their conversation, Gorak further told Baklanov that the KSC would be adopting a similar outlook as the Italian and French Communist parties, as the CSSR wished to assume leadership of the industrialized, Central European Communist countries, which were closer culturally to the Western nations.⁶

A report delivered at the April Plenum of the CPSU on the 25^th of April, 1968 by Petro Shelest offered a bleak view of the events occurring in Czechoslovakia, and concurrently offered several scapegoats on which to place blame. The section regarding Czechoslovakia opens: “Comrades! The Communists and all workers of our country are especially alarmed about events in Czechoslovakia and the stepped-up activity of revisionist, Zionist, and anti-socialist forces in that country.”⁷ Shelest blames these elements for being behind a petit bourgeois conspiracy to influence the Czechoslovak leadership to accept, as Shelest puts it, “’unlimited’ democratization.” The language in Shelest’s report tries to paint the situation as one where the Czechoslovak leadership is losing its grip and being misled by a few subversive internal elements, rather than willfully moving towards democracy. As a result, despite a few “negative points,” Shelest points out that Dubček’s public speeches show the KSC leadership understands the “necessity of waging a struggle against anti-socialist forces.”⁸ Shelest’s report then turns its lens towards the West: he accuses the American and West German imperialists of making an effort to destabilize the internal situation in Czechoslovakia by manipulating nationalist sentiments among the Czech and Slovak peoples. He additionally accuses the West of supporting a gradual, step-by-step dismantling of the Communist infrastructure in Czechoslovakia; Shelest suggests that the imperialists learned from Hungary in 1956 that a sudden, violent attack to seize power would not work, and instead were pursuing a policy of gradual, peaceful change.⁹ Shelest closes his report by stating that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia contains “healthy forces,” and that the task of the Soviet Union is to provide “comprehensive assistance” to these forces in order to thwart the efforts of their imperialist enemies. Shelest’s report is a sign that, relatively early on, elements of the Soviet party apparatus were already finding ways to rationalize future action in the defense of Communism in Czechoslovakia, and it is a thinly veiled attempt to shift the attention, and blame, away from the central party in Czechoslovakia.

Four days later, Yuri Ilnytskyi again met with Koscelanský in a one on one meeting at the border as a follow-up to their previous meeting on March 18. At this meeting, Koscelanský inquired about what had been discussed at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee; Ilnytskyi replied that the Plenum had not specifically discussed Czechoslovakia, but had instead briefly brushed upon problems on the international scene regarding unity in the Communist movement. (The translator notes that this statement is not false, as numerous other issues were discussed at the Plenum; however it must be said that P. Shelest’s April 25^th report delivered at the Plenum suggests a great deal of concern was given to the “subversive elements” at work in the CSSR).¹⁰ Ilnytskyi also reported that Koscelanský discussed developments in Czechoslovakia: mainly that censorship of the press had been totally lifted, and that all leaders within the CSSR were subject to criticism. Ilnytskyi remarks that this is foolish; that he could not imagine why they would allow such “immature people” to spread propaganda.¹¹ At the conclusion of his report, Ilnytskyi declares that, at this meeting, Koscelanský’s behavior had changed: he was no longer as animated or lively. Ilnytskyi cited that he believed Koscelanský, as one of the original proponents of the reforms, had lost faith in how they were being carried out as the CSSR appeared to be drifting more “to the right;” it appears Ilnytskyi was trying to absolve Koscelanský of some of the responsibility for what seemed like the eventual collapse of Czechoslovak Communism.

May was a busy month for the Ukrainian Soviets. On May 12^th, Ilnytskyi filed a report regarding the Czechoslovak media to the CPSU CC.¹² In it he described a few items he found troubling: the border between West Germany and Czechoslovakia was opened to tourists (who Ilnytskyi referred to as spies, and accused of bringing anti-socialist ideas across the border). Another main point he discusses is, with the lifting of censorship, the Czechoslovak press is reporting on unsavory truths within the CSSR (and, more importantly, within other Communist nations: the Czechoslovak press criticized the weak points of Soviet tank production and released relevant technical data).¹³ A report filed on the seventeenth of May suggested that, much as they may criticize the handling of the German-Czechoslovak border, the Ukrainians had problems of their own. V. Nikitchenko, Chairman of the Committee on State Security under the Ukrainian SSR, cited “the growing influx of foreigners from capitalist countries” and the “opening of new routes for tourists in automobiles” in a list of matters which required greater attention from counterintelligence assets.¹⁴ Nikitchenko’s memorandum requested 208 additional personnel to tackle these issues in the border Oblasts, as the increase in hostile activity was too much for the current staff to keep up with. Five days later, on the 22^nd, KGB Chiefs Ivanov and Kozlov issued a report to Petro Shelest regarding the status of the Czechoslovak-Ukrainian border. The border control checkpoints had been especially busy seizing “ideologically harmful literature:” in the first quarter of 1968, they seized 11,833 items. The previous year they had seized 33,570 items total; four years earlier they had seized 1,500 items total.¹⁵ Shelest cited these statistics in a memorandum to the Politburo dated on the same day, and echoed Nikitchenko’s earlier request by requesting 1,500 additional border patrol personnel for the Western district and 200 additional KGB operational counterintelligence agents.¹⁶ It is apparent here that, with the statistics he cites, Shelest wanted to portray the situation in Czechoslovakia in as negative a light as possible in order to rally support for his cause of securing the border and keeping revolutionary ideas out.

Shelest’s paranoia in the lead up to invasion is also apparent in a series of documents published throughout the rest of May and early June. In them, Shelest requested of the KGB apparatus in Ukraine to report on the activities of the average Ukrainian, as well as his reaction to the events unfolding in the CSSR. The first of these reports is basically gossip collected by both common people residing in the Ukraine and, in the case of the last two examples, statements overheard from Soviet citizens visiting the CSSR. The individuals cited in the first report range from all different professions and ethnic backgrounds: school teachers, factory workers; even a dentist is quoted (it is also specified that said dentist, Jozef Ida-Mois, is a Jew and non-member of the Party).¹⁷ Shelest’s interest in the opinions of common folk on the matter, while hardly out of the ordinary in a totalitarian state, is important: considering the concern he had shown towards the situation in the CSSR, Shelest had an interest in keeping the popular sentiments sweeping Czechoslovakia from sweeping his own jurisdiction. Two subsequent reports outline the reactions to the situation by Soviet citizens visiting the CSSR. On May 30, a report was published by Shelest on the activities of Ukrainian journalists who visited the CSSR on a goodwill tour, who reported encountering widespread anti-Soviet sentiments and shocking displays of anti-socialist behaviors.¹⁸ The second report was published on the fourth of June, and described a group of Soviet workers who participated in an exchange with the CSSR, and encountered locals who described the situation as having gotten worse with time, rather than better.¹⁹

The latter two reports are, more than likely, selective reports of what Shelest wanted to portray: a country in distress, and in need of assistance. It is easy to draw conclusions about Shelest’s intentions from the reports he published, conclusions which could not be drawn from a secondary source: his antipathy towards the reform movement in the CSSR was readily apparent, as was his concern that the movement could spread to his own domain. Fear of losing power, along with losing a valuable ally and buffer in the struggle against the West, pushed Shelest and the other officials within the Soviet Union to work against the tide of reform in Prague. This series of documents illuminates the causes of the Soviet invasion by providing a window through which to peer directly into the internal structures and workings of the CPSU: a perspective a history textbook or second-hand account could not provide. By examining these reports sequentially, the documents in this collection can be strung together in a way that shows the causal links leading up to the ultimate decision to roll back Dubček’s Spring.

Endnotes

1 P. Shelest, Note from P. Shelest to CPSU Central Committee (28 Feb 1968), Wilson Center Cold War International History Project, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

2 Ibid.

3 Yu. Il’nyts’kyi, Memorandum from the Secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast, Ukrainian CP about tensions in Czechoslovakia (21 Mar 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

4 Ibid.

5B. Baklanov, Conversation with the Consul-General of the CSSR in Kyiv, J. Gorak (23 Apr 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

6 Ibid.

7 P. Shelest, Report by P. Shelest on the April 1968 Plenum of the CC CPSU (25 Apr 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Yu. Il’nyts’kyi, Transcarpathian Oblast First Secretary Yu. Il’Nyts’Kyi’s Report to P. Shelest (5 May 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

11 Ibid.

12 Yu. Il’nyts’kyi, Yu. Il’Nyts’Kyi Reports on Items from the Czechoslovak Media (12 May 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

13 Ibid.

14 V. Nikitchenko, A Memorandum to the Ukrainian Committee on State Security Regarding Counterintelligence Difficulties (17 May 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

15 KGB Chiefs Ivanov and Kozlov, KGB Border Report to P. Shelest (22 May 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

16 P. Shelest, Memorandum to CPSU Politburo on Western District Border Controls (22 May 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

17 A. Zhabchenko, Summation of Informers from the Transcarpathian Oblast, Ukrainian SSR (25 May 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

18 P. Shelest, Report on Statements by Ukrainian Journalists in the CSSR (30 May 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

19 V. Shcherbytskyi, Report on the Trip by a Delegation of Soviet Workers to the CSSR (6 Jun 1968), Wilson Center CWIHP, Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Collection

Power Players in the Promised Land

[This was my final for my Arab-Israeli conflict class last semester; I figured it was about time to post it here since its been a while since I've posted anything. It was something I actually really enjoyed writing, since I didn't know much of anything about the conflict when going into the class. I find it absolutely fascinating now.]

As Aaron David Miller states in the opening of The Much Too Promised Land, promises have been made by four different parties over the course of history regarding Palestine: first by God, second the British, third the United Nations; fourth the United States. While disputing the validity of the first party would be better suited for a theological discussion, the latter three parties are of particular historic interest when examining the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is not only these three parties which are of interest in the greater conflict, but a whole cast of actors in a play where the Palestinians and Israelis take center stage. Some played more minor roles than others; some played villains and some heroes depending on one’s outlook on the conflict. And still, those characters proved to be so dynamic that, in the eyes of some, they often swapped sides between “good” and “evil.” The British were the single major player throughout much of the first half of the 20th century, the United Nations filled a relatively minor supporting role where it said much and did little; the United States is the newest major player in the search for a resolution to the conflict. Along the way have been the various Arab states and their antagonistic policies towards the Israelis, French policies backing the British; even the waning Ottoman Empire made an appearance. All of these actors have had interests in Palestine, and all of them have attempted to exercise those interests. The next few pages shall discuss these parties, their interests, the means through which they attempted to implement those interests, and their successes and failures in implementing said interests. Perhaps it would be bold of me to say that it is all quite ‘interesting.’
In the early days of the Palestinian conflict, before there was a true conflict, there were two  facts known: there were Arabs in Palestine, and Jews in Europe. Avi Shlaim describes the situation in the opening of The Iron Wall: “The Zionist movement, which emerged in Europe in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, aimed at the national revival of the Jewish people in its ancestral home after nearly 2000 years in exile.” This “Zionism” found its roots in Europe for two reasons: much of the diaspora had settled in Europe following the sack of Jerusalem at the hands of Titus, and their time spent living in Europe had been made “uncomfortable” by European leaders. On the opposite side of the stage, in the Promised Land itself, the star playing opposite the Zionists entered. As Morris states in Righteous Victims, Zionism had a twenty-five year head start on Palestinian-Arab Nationalism, which was developing in the latter half of the nineteenth century in opposition to the Ottomans. While, as Morris points out, the Arabs were loyal to the Islamic polity of the Ottoman Empire, many desired political distance. These feelings strengthened in 1877 when St. Petersburg declared war on Istanbul. Many Arab conscripts died in the war, which ultimately led to Ottoman defeat, and further alienated the Turks from Arabs. During this period, ups and downs would occur in Arab nationalism, and the first Aliyah (also influenced by Russia, but through pogroms) would bring thousands of Zionist settlers to the region. Morris points out in Victims that, although many returned to Russia or headed West, between 1881 and 1903 roughly 20,000 to 30,000 Jews made the journey to Palestine. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the stage had been set for the two principal actors in the drama. Their objectives were clear: the Zionists wanted a state in Palestine; the Palestinians had similar ambitions. Neither would deviate from these goals. It was time for the first of the major supporting cast members to enter in the throes of the Great War.

Two fateful shots fired in Sarajevo in June 1914 plunged the world into a war the scale of which had not yet been seen. While the First World War would be fought primarily on the fields of France, it would forever change the face of the Middle East. In November of 1914, the Ottomans threw their lot in with the Germans in the Central Powers’ struggle against the Allies, and the British, who Morris points out had previously worked towards maintaining the status quo in the Middle East to prevent other imperial powers from gaining where the Ottomans would lose, now felt that their own interests were at risk. The war would see the British deal duplicitously with various parties in the region during their struggle against the Ottomans, as they would make dealings and promises with both groups on the Arabian peninsula as well as Zionist influences within Britain. As Morris explains, it was the Suez Canal which made the British especially fearful for their imperial possessions. Once Turkey had been taken care of, however, Britain had another concern: containing Russian imperial interests. The British turned to the local Arab populations, first, who in 1915 finally managed to convince the British to support an Arab revolt against the Ottomans. The Arabs, of course, sought independence from the Ottomans; the British would perhaps grant them “autonomy under British tutelage.” Finally, in November 1915, the approximate shape of the interbellum Middle East was formed with the entry of Britain’s lesser accomplice to the drama in Palestine: France. François Georges-Picot and Sir Mark Sykes would meet in relative secret until, in 1916, an agreement divided the Middle East into two zones of influence between them. French interests were straightforward: secure influence, and solidify France’s political power in the region. Britain’s intentions, meanwhile, were similar, but took on a different aspect as the Zionist lobby gained clout within Whitehall. Chaim Weizmann in particular, Shlaim states, was crucial in winning over the British to the Zionist cause. Weizmann played off of both the British interests in having a friendly nation in the region (mainly to protect trade routes through the Suez), but also played off of British values. The fact that he wore a suit and tie rather than robes and sandals perhaps also made him more tolerable for the British. Regardless, in November 1917 Weizmann’s efforts bore fruit as His Majesty’s Government’s Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour issued his famous declaration. The waning hours of the Ottoman Empire finally past, it was time for Palestine to fall into the hands of a power even further removed than Istanbul: London.

Immediately following the war, Arabic reactions to the Balfour Declaration were “disapproving” at best. In 1919, the “Syrian Arab Congress” convened under Faisal I, and declared its opposition to Zionism and the settlement of Palestine. Britain and France together waved off the declaration from Faisal, and the Zionists were permitted to continue their settlement by the British as they laid the groundwork for their eventual “commonwealth.” Violence between the Arabs and Zionists was largely averted during this early period; Morris specifically cites the annual Nabi Musa celebrations, where anti-Zionist sentiments ran rampant. Violence in this particular case, and overall, was prevented by precautions taken by the British military. It was finally in July of 1922 that the British were officially granted their Mandate by the League of Nations over Palestine. The Mandate included the entire text of the Balfour Declaration, and specifically outlined that it was “the Mandatory power’s duty” to facilitate the Jewish people’s establishment of institutions. It was during this period that Khalidi points to the Palestinians prodding the British for self determination and national institutions similar to those being developed for the Jews; they cited Wilson’s fourteen points as the basis of their claims. Their pleas seemed to fall on deaf ears, as each time they asked they were told to accept the Mandate and their status within its framework. This is the Iron Cage which Khalidi describes in the title of his book: the Palestinians were denied their political rights, unless they accepted a charter which granted them no political rights. In order to maintain control over the country, Khalidi adds, the British, unlike in other regions where they utilized local rulers to carry out their policies, maintained direct control over the Mandate. The Jews were granted autonomy within this Mandate, and even had diplomatic representation through the Jewish Agency; the Arabs had no such thing. While the British were not entirely malevolent here, they did little to help.

British control led to erratic governance, where Whitehall and Westminster were detached from the daily policy making, and such policies were left to local officers to make. The result was a period of flip-flopping, between pandering to the Zionists and sympathy towards the Arabs, by the Mandatory authority. The Arabs gradually grew weary of the situation, and in 1936 took up arms. This first revolt was especially long and bloody, and led to sporadic periods of violence. Bickering between the Arabs and Jews climaxed by 1939, when a rebellion claimed the lives of nearly 100 Jews and over 400 Arabs. Britain, growing weary of the cost of the conflict, issued the White Paper of 1939 in May under Chamberlain’s government. The White Paper represented an absolute about-face in British policy, as their interests changed from assisting the Jews to merely appeasing the Arabs to end the violence: it limited immigration, halted Jews from buying land; among other restrictions. The Zionists were outraged, and revisionist elements in particular (namely Haganah, a paramilitary organization of the time) began a guerrilla war against the British. Even so, antipathy towards the British was short-lived: worldwide war was imminent once again, and this time it would have special significance for not only the Zionists, but Jews everywhere. On September 1st, 1939, German tanks rolled into Poland. On September 3rd, 1939, Britain declared war on Germany. The world was yet again plunged into war, this one more destructive than the previous. The same day as the British declaration of war, the Jewish Agency declared its allegiance to the British. During the war, however, a campaign of illegal immigration by Jews into Palestine was undertaken in opposition to the standards established by the 1939 White Paper. Although the British were harsh in punishing it, the status-quo of the White Paper was only kept in place to keep the Arabs complacent, even after the German threat to the Middle East was eliminated. When Churchill came to the Premiership, he set to work filling his councils with pro-Zionists in preparation for the post-war period. As it turned out, he likely did not need to do so, as the Germans had succeeded in making the strongest case yet for the establishment of a Jewish state: the “greatest pogrom of all time,” the Holocaust.

In 1947, the British washed their hands of Palestine. It was now the infant United Nations’ turn to take charge in finding a solution. On November 29th, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of a partition resolution, a solution ruled out by the 1939 White Paper. The land was to be divided between the Jews and the Arabs, with the Jews receiving more land but mostly in the desert. It was seen as the best means for peace, which was among the UN’s only objectives. Morris points out that the resolution passed by a slim margin, but more interesting was the fact that Britain abstained from the vote. After only a day, though, war came. In the short term, the country was still nominally under the protection of the British, which kept the Arab states at bay. The British did not keep the Palestinians down, though, as the first stage of war, from 1947 to 1948, took the form of a civil war. In five months of fighting, the Jews had dealt crushing blows to Palestinian numbers, military capabilities, and morale. On May 14th, with the British in full withdrawal, the Jews declared themselves as the state of Israel. The second phase of the war, as well as the latter half of the 20th century, began.
The Arab nations had been playing a background role in the conflict for some time; it was now that they would step into the fray as Israel’s main antagonists. From May 15, 1948 until the spring of 1949, hostilities would exist between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The Israelis would use lessons learned in the first stage of the war to excel in combat against the Arab armies. Morris mentions that, in the early days, the British came back for an encore performance, and brought their old friends, the French, and their new friends, the Americans: the three nations executed an arms embargo against the Middle East. The measure devastated Arab supply lines, as they were dependent upon British and French arms imports. The Israelis, meanwhile, had resorted to dealing with private sellers and the Czechs; they had the cash and connections to successfully do so. By 1949, the Arab armies had more or less been crushed, and armistice talks proved fruitful in securing Israel. For the next few decades, wars would be intermittent as Arab goals shifted from the destruction of Israel to saving face; the Americans and Soviets would step in on the sides of Israel and the Arabs, respectively, as battle lines were drawn during the Cold War. Despite this polarized atmosphere, the Americans would take on yet another role; one which would last them into the new millenium as the primary power broker in Palestine.

Despite support for Israel, American interests also played into the peace process. The Suez Crisis in 1956 marked the end of British and French colonial ambitions, and the beginning of the dominance of American and Soviet spheres. As mentioned, the two would go on to oppose each other in the Middle East through their Israeli and Arabic client states, but even so the Americans had a vested interest in a peace process. While America supplied Israel with arms on one hand, it sent diplomats to the region to initiate talks between the Israelis and Arabs. As Miller points out in Promised Land, domestic interests in the United States play a crucial factor in US policy, and peace is perhaps the best method to attempt to cater to all interests within America on the issue. During the Cold War, dialogue with the Arab states also meant many could be wrenched from the Soviets’ grip. More importantly, especially today, peace brings stability and security to the region, and ensures the safety of Israel. Such was part of the agenda when Sadat extended his hand to the Israelis, and Jimmy Carter ran with it to Camp David. Other Arab states soon followed; when Israel’s position within the Middle East was secured with most of its neighbors, the US realized the need for the internal peace process to kick into high gear. Such is the nature of the peace process today, as the Palestinians still dream of statehood.
External interested parties have always had a stake in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from as nearby as Cairo, to as far away as London, Moscow, and Washington. Perhaps the most successful party in achieving its goals thus far have been the Americans, whose devotion to the peace process has brought stability in the region between the Arab states and Israel. Now, however, comes America’s greatest hurdle: the internal status of the Palestinians. Other parties have either changed or abandoned their goals: the Arabs have mostly accepted Israel’s existence, the British have largely removed themselves from the situation since the failure of the Mandate, the French have retreated from the region nearly altogether, the Russians first indirectly affected the situation (as with pogroms) but then supplied Arab states to supplant American interests prior to the end of the Cold War; the Turks lost all stake in the area with the fall of their Empire. Will American efforts go the way of the British? Or can American promises pull through and see the establishment of a Palestinian polity? “Never,” “no way,” and “not a chance” are all the most likely answers, but one thing is certain: until failure actually comes about, the United States will surely keep persisting in its efforts.

The Triumvirate of Palestine: Three Documents Which Shaped Modern Zion

[The following is my mid term which I wrote for HIST 284, a course on the Arab/Israeli conflict, dealing with three documents which shaped the foundation of the modern state of Israel and the current situation.]

The territory of Palestine, and the modern state of Israel which resides within its borders, traces its scarred, bloody lineage directly to the imperial ambitions of western Europe of the prewar era. At first dominated by the Turks, the fate of Palestine was ultimately to be determined by parties far removed from the ground, and from the people. As the Ottoman Empire met its waning hours, the major powers of Europe moved forward to carve up the remnants among themselves, and to claim their spheres of influence in the Middle East. Three documents in particular were created by that power which ascended to the position of Palestine’s imperial keeper, Great Britain: one during the latter stages of WWI, the secretive Sykes-Picot Agreement; one during the closing months of the war, the (in)famous Balfour Declaration; and one during the late interbellum period, the White Paper of 1939. Each of the three documents played a role, some more notably than others, in the development of the current situation within the modern Israeli state. While some aspects of the three were interrelated, other differences are made especially apparent when considering the documents’ varying purposes, authors, and influences. However, their differences notwithstanding, these three documents intertwined to shape the current rift between the Islamic and Jewish populations of Palestine. Through studying and analyzing the three, it becomes possible to partially understand a few of the countless factors which contributed to the current status quo in Palestine.

The first of the three documents, the secretive Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, was convened by the British and French governments during the First World War to carve up the Middle East into spheres of influence in the aftermath of the expected fall of the Ottoman Empire. The talks for Sykes-Picot began in November 1915: France was represented by François Georges-Picot; the British by Sir Mark Sykes. Picot demanded the area the French defined as “Syria” for an area of French interest and influence: in reality modern day Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Northern Iraq, and part of Anatolia (Morris 70). Sykes, meanwhile, pursued British interests in Palestine, Jordan, and Mesopotamia. By January of 1916, the two were able to iron out an agreement where both parties were granted roughly what they wanted: Britain’s sphere of influence lay in the south, consisting of most of modern day Iraq and of parts of Palestine, while France’s area consisted of the north with much of what they had originally referred to as “Syria.” A joint zone was developed within the majority of Palestine, specifically Gaza, which was to be administered jointly by the French-British Allied forces (Morris 70-71). While mostly wishful thinking towards the not-long-off destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the agreement had real ramifications for Palestine as it cemented British interests in the region, namely the Suez Canal and the Anglo trade routes it facilitated (specifically to India). The divisions outlined by Sykes-Picot also assisted in the establishment of the various postwar League of Nations Mandates, however Britain’s scrapping of Sykes-Picot, due in no small part to its near unilateral victory over the Ottoman Empire on the eastern front, saw France excluded from much of the territory it was originally granted. In particular, Britain took total dominion over Palestine and Gaza, and was able to completely exclude France from the originally planned joint-control zone (Morris 88). Sykes-Picot had additional ramifications for the future of Arab-western relations, however: concurrently with the formation of Sykes-Picot, Britain had promised Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, an Arab Empire in return for his assistance against the Ottomans. The nature of Sykes-Picot undermined this promise, as Britain would be unable to fulfill both agreements (Shlaim 7). These two were not the only wartime promises Britain would be unable to fulfill, however, as November 1917 brought perhaps one of the most important documents contributing to the current state of affairs in the state of Israel in the present day.

Chaim Weizmann, born in Russia and later emigrated to London, became one of the most notable leaders of the Zionist movement in the United Kingdom. He became noteworthy in many of the inner circles of His Majesty’s Government for his contributions in the field of artillery shell manufacture, which was especially helpful to the Allied war effort. By 1920, he had been elected president of the World Zionist Organization (Shlaim 6). The former was the cause; the latter the effect of his influence in crafting the “Balfour Declaration” of 1917, which was to become one of the single most important documents to the Zionist cause. The Balfour Declaration, a letter issued by the British government stating support for the establishment of a “Jewish Home” in Palestine, found its roots, ironically, in a similar declaration issued by the French Quay d’Orsay not five months earlier. At this time, the Zionist organization had offices with both the Allied and Central Powers, effectively making itself neutral. The French were convinced by one Nahum Sokolow, a Russian Zionist who would later play a crucial role alongside Weizmann in the creation of the Balfour Declaration, to open themselves up to the Zionist cause in an attempt to preempt the Germans in making a similar declaration (Morris 73-74). Weizmann was soon able to convince the British to follow the French lead, playing upon British trade interests in the region: the same interests which had factored into the creation of Sykes-Picot. Weizmann was able to convince the British government that a Jewish commonwealth would be a valuable asset to the British Empire; an allied state so near the Suez would be a major help in securing trade routes. Weizmann’s own interests were quite obvious as well: if the Zionists were to achieve their goal of international recognition, no nation could thrust the Zionist cause to the forefront of the world stage better than the preeminent world power of the time: the British Empire (Shlaim 6-7). During the negotiations to develop the Declaration, there were three parties which participated: the British government, the Zionists, and non-Zionist British Jews. Each of the three parties had specific objectives they sought to establish and defend. The British government was primarily concerned with winning the war, and sought support from any and all parties it could. The Zionists (led by Weizmann and Sokolow), meanwhile, sought international recognition for their cause: a Jewish state in Palestine. The non-Zionist Jews (represented by Edwin Montagu and Claude Montefiore), however, had other interests: the preservation of the rights of Jews elsewhere, besides within a proposed Jewish homeland in Palestine (Mallison 66-67).

The declaration underwent six drafts, before a finalized version was approved to be published by Balfour’s Foreign Office. The Foreign Office created a first draft, which outlined the creation of a refuge and sanctuary for oppressed Jewish populations in Palestine. The Zionists found the language of the first draft to be insufficient, and set out to create a draft of their own. In the Zionists’ early draft, they were quick to list their demands almost in full: the draft first used the term “National Home” to describe the Zionists’ desired status within Palestine, and further established “Jewish internal autonomy” and “unlimited immigration.” Both Balfour and Sokolow had their reservations with this draft, and Sokolow soon returned with a draft he felt was more concise and fitting for the cause, which outlined two specific principles: (1) the recognition of Palestine as the Jewish national home and (2) the recognition of the Zionist Organization (Mallison 71-72). Balfour returned in kind with what is referred to as a “slightly revised version” of the Zionist Draft, showing de facto approval for the Zionist objectives by the foreign minister. It was understood, however, that such a clear acceptance of Zionist motives would not find itself in the rest of the Cabinet’s good graces. It was therefore left to Lord Alfred Milner to prepare a draft to present to the Cabinet. Milner’s draft was less explicit in its support of Zionism, but even so the non-Zionist (soon to become anti-Zionist) Jews were slow to accept even a watered down version of the Balfour draft. Montagu, the only Jewish member of the Cabinet, railed against the proposal, supporting the interests of the local Christian and Muslim populations against the prospect of being replaced by implanted Jews (Mallison 73-75). The Zionists were quick to counter, as Weizmann and Mark Sykes, the previous architect of Sykes-Picot, drafted a memorandum which retreated further from previous Zionist objectives: rather than a Jewish “republic” or “commonwealth” in Palestine, they would instead seek recognition as a “national unit” which would be “federated” with the other, local populations (Mallison 76). The resulting Milner-Amery draft included the two safeguard clauses which protected Jews abroad and the local Palestinian populations which would have otherwise been supplanted by the influx of Jews (Mallison 77-80).

The Milner-Amery draft evolved into the final draft which was then approved and published by His Majesty’s Government. While numerous concessions had been made for the non/anti-Zionist Jews, the declaration was still hailed as a victory for Zionists. The declaration served as one of the founding documents of the Zionist push for statehood in Palestine, and while such a reference had been specifically omitted from the text of the declaration, Balfour himself said that he hoped “the Jews will make good in Palestine and eventually found a Jewish State.” He referred to the declaration as their “great opportunity (Morris 75).” While the Balfour Declaration was a victory for the Zionists, it would also serve some British interests. Much of the spirit of the declaration would be incorporated into the later mandate, specifically articles 2, 4, 6, 7, 11, and 22. These articles related to the obligation of the mandatory power to “foster and support” the development of a Jewish nation in Palestine, which gave the British cause (and imperial ambitions) in Palestine legitimacy. This obviously also assisted the Jews, whose national institutions would be shaped and tailored by the British during the mandatory period (Khalidi 32). The long term effects of Balfour have been far reaching on the status quo of the conflict in contemporary times, and are reflected by many Zionists’ assertion that the Balfour Declaration was an official recognition of Zionism as a movement, and that it was a blessing by the British Empire for the eventual establishment of a Jewish state.

The final of the three documents, which played less of a crucial role in the actual establishment of Israel and more of a role as a catalyst for the eventual independence and formation of Israel, was the White Paper of 1939. The White Paper of 1939, also known as the MacDonald White Paper for the Minister who presided over it, was published and accepted under the Chamberlain Ministry, and represented a nearly complete about-face in British policy regarding Palestine. The White Paper was the product of the intense fighting and revolt which had been ongoing in Palestine between 1936 and 1939, and was an attempt by Whitehall to appease the Arabs with political concessions in an attempt to keep native populations elsewhere complacent (Morris 156-157). The British set out to appease the Arabs’ demands in 1939 (a policy Chamberlain’s government was already somewhat famous for) by essentially limiting the amount of support they would lend to the Jews and increasing the political rights and protections of Arab populations. A cap of 75,000 in five years was proposed for Jewish immigration. Additionally, Jews were forbidden from purchasing land in certain districts, and it was also proposed that an Arab-majority rule state be established within ten years’ time (Morris 158). The White Paper of 1939 effectively negated the previous findings of the Peel Commission, which had suggested separate states for Jews and Arabs in Palestine. While its publishing was not entirely unexpected, as it was the product of policy and events during the interwar years which saw increased Arab militancy, many within the Zionist community, especially Weizmann, felt bitter about the change in policy (Shlaim 10). The revisionist Zionist community, led by Ze’ev Jabotinsky, embarked on a campaign of anti-British terrorism in response to the new limits placed on the Yishuv, which laid the seeds for the eventual severance of the Jewish community in Palestine from the British as the mandate crumbled (Morris 161). The White Paper of 1939 was originally meant to benefit the Arab peoples of Palestine, but in this way it was also inadequate. Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was especially vociferous in his opposition to the White Paper, which revealed the deep divisions within Palestinian society and the failings of the Palestinians’ national institutions to unite them in the face of certain subjugation. While initially cooperative with the British, the mufti gradually changed his outlook as talks with the British dissolved, and he eventually openly denounced the White Paper, aligning himself with the younger, more militant sects of Palestinian society who had previously criticized him for collaborating with the British. The mufti demanded full independence for Palestine, but at this point he was ignored by the British, who largely blamed him for the revolts between 1936 and 1939 (Khalidi 115-117). The unwillingness of the Arabs to compromise, combined with the resistance to the limits imposed upon the Yishuv by the Zionists, resulted in the White Paper of 1939 contributing greatly to the current situation in the Arab/Israeli conflict: the White Paper caused a rift to form between the British and Yishuv, and caused the rift between the Palestinians and Yishuv to deepen further.

These three documents hold special significance in the history of Palestine/Israel as being primary catalysts for major events which shaped the current structure of the situation today. Each had their own beneficiaries, actual or intended, and each also had their own specific purposes. They intertwine in the sense that their effects built upon one another up until the establishment of the state of Israel: for Sykes-Picot, the agreement established Britain’s interests and eventual dominance in Palestine and the Middle East at large. For the Balfour Declaration, Britain’s imperial interests in the region were furthered with the prospect of an allied Jewish state to safeguard trade lines to India. Somewhat in contrast, the White Paper of 1939 represented an about-face in British policy, as Chamberlain’s Ministry attempted to undo both what it may have perceived as “moral wrongs” and what it knew as political and societal instability, as the Arab revolts against Jewish settlement had gained Britain’s attention with the potential of throwing other colonial possessions into chaos. The White Paper failed in that regard, however, as it delayed the inevitable: Zionist resistance, both covert and overt, ensured the survival of the Yishuv, and Palestinian disjointedness ensured a unified Arab state in Palestine would remain an impossibility, even with British support. The inevitable, of course, was the establishment of a Jewish state in 1948, and the war and conflict which surrounded the circumstance. Sykes-Picot opened the door to Jewish statehood, the Balfour Declaration gave the Zionists the means to do it; The White Paper of 1939 gave them a cause célèbre to pursue it.

Works Cited

Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Beacon Pr, 2007.

Mallison, W.T. “The Balfour Declaration: An Appraisal in International Law”. The Transformation of Palestine. Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim, ed. Northwestern University Press, 1971.

Morris, Benny. Righteous victims: a history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881-2001. Vintage, 2001.

Shlaim, Avi. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. W. W. Norton & Company, 2001.

Reversing a Century of Law

[Written for my second semester American Politics regarding the landmark decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. It's a short but sweet analysis drawn from a couple different news sources.]

On Thursday, 21 January of this year, the Supreme Court decided in favor of Citizens United in the case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, causing an about face in the laws which have governed elections for over a century. The decision, which saw a narrow vote of five to four, has been among the most controversial news topics of recent weeks, and has garnered much criticism from varying ends of the political spectrum. Perhaps among the most notable of the decision’s critics is President Obama, who has openly declared his opposition to the court’s opinion on numerous occasions; prime among them his referencing the decision in his first State of the Union address.

Justice Kennedy’s opinion made reference to the statutes and precedents the court’s decision overturned, and specifically pointed out in his opening that, in this case, the court was asked to reexamine McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and the earlier Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, as well as 2 U. S. C. §441b. The former two cases, taking place in 2003 and 1990 respectively (Cornell Citizens United), had dealt with campaign finance law and the ability of the complaining parties to contribute to independent media campaigns (that is, media campaigns promoted by third parties aside from the candidate him or herself). These two decisions went alongside Section 441b of Title 2 of the US Code, and upheld the law which defined limitations on these sorts of contributions (Cornell US Code). The majority upheld, and Justice Kennedy outlined in the opinion, that these previous decisions and statutes violated the first amendment in limiting the funds that entities could contribute to independent campaign efforts based upon their corporate identities (Cornell Citizens United).

As the National Journal’s Eliza Carney is quick to point out, however, this reversal in campaign finance law is not as extensive as some people seem to believe, specifically because of the “independent media campaigns” outlined above: “Second, the court’s dramatic reversal does not threaten the existing ban on direct corporate and union campaign contributions,” she explains, “So while those players may now lavish money from their treasuries on independent campaign expenditures, they still may not donate directly to candidates.” Eliza’s criticism extends further, as she outlines later her fears of undue corporate and union influence in elections (Carney). The editorial voice of the Wall Street Journal, however, stands in stark disagreement with Ms. Carney’s analysis of the situation. “Freedom has had its best week in many years. On Tuesday, Massachusetts put a Senate check on a reckless Congress,” it starts, referencing Scott Brown’s ascent to the Kennedy throne, “and yesterday the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision supporting free political speech by overturning some of Congress’s more intrusive limits on election spending.” The editorial continues mainly in supporting the decision for its Constitutional roots, and it optimistically opines that someday the Court may overturn further restrictions on corporate and other donations (Wall Street Journal).

Of course, these examples of opposition and support, respectively, are commonplace. Unique is the opinion of the decision’s biggest detractor: President Obama. As the BBC reported on the day of the decision, President Obama was quoted as saying it was a major victory for his usual nemeses: “…big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans (BBC News).” Obama also used his weekly radio address to assault Citizens United, going so far as to use inflamed rhetoric that the ruling “strikes at our democracy itself (Burnes).” Of course, these statements pale in comparison to his reference to Citizens United on the 27^th of January during the State of the Union. The President declared that the decision was a massive mistake, that it would “open the floodgates,” and that it had reversed “a century of law (Toobin).” Obama’s statement, placing him among the decision’s largest detractors, drew a reaction from one the the decision’s largest supporters: Justice Alito. Alito’s reaction to the President’s declaration hardly went unnoticed, and became a major headline overnight as cameras caught Alito giving a reaction most commentators thought unbecoming of a justice: Alito was seen sitting amongst his fellow justices shaking his head, and while audio could not be heard, his lips clearly declared: “Not true, not true.” Alito’s reaction stands in contrast to the image often portrayed of the Supreme Court justice: stately, reserved; above the political machinations of the District. This contrast is where much of the controversy over his reaction stems (Toobin). President Obama, however, has received much the same criticism in addition to that from Alito over his blatant snipe at the court. As The Washington Post reports, numerous legal experts have published opinions on both the decision itself and the ensuing debate. The Post quotes Lucas Powe, an expert on the Court from the University of Texas law school: “I can’t ever recall a president taking a swipe at the Supreme Court like that.” The closest example Powe was able to cite was a comment made by FDR during his 1937 address to Congress (Barnes).

Some legal experts, according to the same Washington Post article, are now calling into question future relations between the Court and the executive branch. The article cites the Court’s seemingly forced appearance at such events as the State of the Union: a cadre of black-clad stoics who are meant to be seen as immune to the partisan, boisterous crowd surrounding it. Add to this such high officers of state as the President attacking the Court’s decision, and some validity is added to the idea that Powe puts forth: “I do not expect to see justices at the next State of the Union address (Barnes).” No matter what these events formulate into further down the road, it is almost certain that the relationship between the executive and judicial branches will fundamentally change. Whether or not this means the Court will not attend the next Address is left in question, and that question will not be answered for nearly a year.

Works Cited

Barnes, Robert. “Reactions split on Obama’s remark, Alito’s response at State of the Union.” The Washington Post. 29 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2010/01/28/AR2010012802893.html?sid=ST2010012803706>.

Burnes, Judith. “Obama Assails Supreme Court Ruling On Political Advertising.” Wall Street Journal. 23 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100123- 700221.html>.

Carney, Eliza. “Court Unlikely To Stop With Citizens United.” National Journal Online. 21 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/rg_20100121_2456.php>.

Toobin, Jeffrey. “Alito’s Face.” The New Yorker. 28 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2010/01/alitos-face.html>.

“CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N.” Cornell University Law School. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-205.ZO.html>.

“A Free Speech Landmark.” Wall Street Journal. 22 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703699204575016843479815072.html>.

“US Code: Title 2, § 441b. Contributions or expenditures by national banks, corporations, or labor organizations.” Cornell University Law School. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/2/441b.html>.

“US Supreme Court overturns campaign spending limit.” BBC News. 21 Jan 2010. Web. 16 Feb 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8473253.stm>.

Locke and the Second Treatise of Civil Government

[Written for my Euro History class, this analysis struck a nerve with me since Locke is arguably my greatest political influence. I'm actually pretty damn proud of this one.]

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Arguably among John Locke’s most important and influential works, the Second Treatise of Civil Government is an analytical work regarding the purposes and functions of government, as well as how it operates with regard to society at large. Published in 1689, the Second Treatise is a compilation of Locke’s own beliefs regarding government and its various aspects. Ordered into nineteen chapters, and further subdivided into a total of two-hundred forty-three sections, Locke’s work begins with several fundamental concepts key to his philosophy, then outlines the purposes and limits of both government and civil society, and finally describes the two entities’ relationships therein. The work, however, is written by Locke in such a way that is meant to be simple to understand and easy to grasp. Locke does not rely on rhetoric to promote his arguments, and instead relies upon the arguments by themselves and his logical and philosophical justifications for them. In the preface to his Second Treatise, Locke himself states that “cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little incident of my discourse, is not an answer to my book” and that “I shall not take railing for arguments.” Locke thereby establishes Second Treatise as a work rooted in what he perceives as fact, and not in sensationalism or rhetorical arguments. To fully understand Locke’s arguments, however, one must understand his credentials and background, as well. With this knowledge, it becomes easier to understand the context within which Locke’s Second Treatise was written, and just why it has become one of the most influential works of modern political thought to date.

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John Locke was born a lawyer’s son in August of 1632, in the town of Wrington, Somerset. Locke’s father, also named John, was a country lawyer and a Puritan man who had served in the English Civil War on the side of the Parliamentarians. It was this connection which allowed Locke an excellent education: Locke’s father’s commander in the Civil War became the local Member of Parliament, and it was through this connection that young Locke was afforded an education at Westminster School in London, which was among the most prestigious educational institutions of the time in England. Following Locke’s education at Westminster, he attended Christ Church, Oxford in 1652. It was here that Locke indulged himself in his studies, particularly in those of medicine and experimental science, both of which were outside of the standard curriculum. Locke graduated with his B.A. in 1656, and subsequently with his M.A. in 1658. Following his education, he spent a short period as a teacher at Christ Church for four years, however declined to teach further as to do so would require him to enter a holy order. It was during this time that Locke had begun reading such figures as Boyle and Descartes, the former whom Locke knew personally from his experience at Oxford. When Locke read Descartes, however, he admired the Frenchman’s outlook in contrast to the Aristotelian philosophy he had been taught at Oxford: philosophy he had found to be largely useless and sterile. His reading both Boyle and Descartes, and his working with Boyle directly, greatly solidified his interests in two fields: his admiration of Boyle solidified his interest in the natural sciences, while his admiration of Descartes solidified his interest in political and social philosophy. It was in 1666 when Locke met and became close friends with Lord Ashley, later to become 1st Earl of Shaftesbury. Locke became the Lord’s medical advisor, despite his lack of training as a physician, but moreover he became the Lord’s closest confidant and advisor in all matters. The men particularly found friendship in one another because of likeness in their political beliefs: both promoted a constitutional monarchy, both promoted civil liberties, both promoted the rule of Parliament, and both shared many other beliefs. Ashley himself was a prominent politician, and with their connection Locke was often granted a say in numerous matters of state and of personal interest to the Lord. By 1647, now Lord Shaftesbury had left government, and Locke returned to Oxford to actually pursue medicine. Locke was forced into exile, however, when Shaftesbury fell into disfavor with King Charles II. It was discovered that a number of Shaftesbury’s followers and friends had plotted an assassination attempt against the King, and under scrutiny Locke fled England for Holland where he remained until 1688. When the Glorious Revolution occurred in 1688, Locke returned to England aboard the royal yacht. It was on his return that Locke published a number of works, but most importantly, in this context, he published his Two Treatises on Civil Government. Published anonymously, the Two Treatises, particularly the Second Treatise, were an enumeration of Locke’s beliefs regarding government and the divine right of kings, which had been eliminated in England by the Glorious Revolution; it was a defense overall of the Glorious Revolution and the new King William. Locke’s later years, until his death in 1704, were spent in relative retirement, however he continued to publish works and serve in public life until 1700.

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Considering the political climate of Locke’s England, especially upon his return in 1688, it should be no surprise regarding his previous beliefs towards constitutional government that he worked in his Second Treatise to discredit the divine right of kings. As one can see even by only skimming the chapter titles for their central themes, Locke’s work in Second Treatise postulates a society rooted in moral ideals and common principles where individuals, society at large, and the governments they create work towards maintaining order. The last of these three is paramount: it is Locke’s belief that governments are created solely by the people and to serve the people, particularly to protect the properties of individuals, and that if a government does otherwise, it has done wrong. Specifically, for instance, one can reference Section 87 of Chapter VII in how it relates man to civil society and to political society, where political society serves as an “umpire” with regard to the natural laws which exist for all men, asserted earlier in Chapter II and onwards. It is in this way that Locke balances the various aspects of society and theorizes social contract: the idea that people give up some rights to ensure the protection of others, specifically property rights as established in Chapter V. It is also through these arguments that Locke promotes the rule of law, and that if the rule of law fails to carry out its prescribed duties, then the civil government established to maintain said law has failed in its duties. Among the more notable examples of this in Locke’s text is covered in Chapter III: “Of the State of War;” it is in Section 20 of this chapter where Locke equates a miscarriage of justice to the violence of the crime which the law failed to properly prosecute. In addition, in further promoting his theory that the state is responsible to the people and that no ruler may rule without his (or her) people’s consent, the final chapter of Locke’s Second Treatise sets out the mechanisms by which a society may change its government if it fails to serve the people correctly. Chapter XIX, aptly titled “Of the Dissolution of Government,” sets forth the causes, justifications, and ideas which should “govern” the dismantling of a system of government in favor of a system which would perform in a capacity better suited to serve the people and protect their rights and liberties. It is with this chapter that Locke sets forth a map of sorts by which both current and future individuals could justify their own revolutions with, in addition to further solidifying and legitimizing the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and subsequently legitimizing the reign of the new King William.

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Locke’s Second Treatise is, as stated, among the most influential works of modern western political thought ever published. The Second Treatise, and the other works of Locke, have inspired countless political movements and several revolutions, and perhaps most notably the ideals of Locke were embodied in the Declaration of Independence and its assertion to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” as well as subsequently being featured in the US Constitution. To read Locke’s Second Treatise directly, rather than to read about it through other means such as through interpretative essays or textbook accounts of his work, gives the reader a glimpse into Locke’s very own words and ideas. Thusly, it opens up Locke’s own work for direct interpretation, and allows the reader to observe it in context with regard to the historical circumstances surrounding it. To study the Second Treatise through reading it is to glimpse back towards the circumstances surrounding the Glorious Revolution of 1688, where for the first time in English history the dominance of Parliament was fully asserted over the power of the monarch. It was during this period of time that modern liberal thought began to develop, particularly in England where the nature of English law and government had allowed such thought to flourish in the light of healthy political discourse. Locke, as a major figure of early liberal political philosophy, laid the foundation for the rise of such prominent western powers such as the expanded British Empire and the United States of America, where his ideas and theories were incorporated into the basic compositions of these two great nations’ governments, and of their derivatives and imitators. The modern western liberal nation-state owes much of its origin to Locke’s basic philosophical ideals, for without his contributions and influence it is doubtful that such great political revolutions and changes would have occurred as extensively they did.

Bible Thumpers and Mullahs, Ayatollahs and Pontiffs

[The following is a piece written for AP English, senior year. It was a group project, actually I believe there were five in my group. Why is it so short? Because I wrote it all myself the night before, of course. Did my group do research? Of course. Did I use some of it? Obviously. Did I use the sections they wrote up for me? Of course not. Hence, the grade was a B- since it was expected to be longer. I can't say the majority of my group was unhappy.

It was originally cited, but since this is a weblog I cba to properly cite much of anything. If there are a few citations that I missed because I don't feel like reading through again, so be it. Also, WordPress formatting was being a bitch so I had to get a little creative in some spots, namely line spacing. Enjoy.]

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Fundamentalism; noun: a movement or attitude stressing strict and literal adherence to a set of basic principles. Such is how the Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines the term. However, a textbook definition is but a fraction of the true meaning of “fundamentalism,” considering the wide range of connotations for the word and variations of fundamentalist ideologies in the world. Perhaps the largest of these ranges would be of fundamentalism of the religious variety; a form of the idea of strict adherence to set principles that has existed for centuries the world over. Religious fundamentalism knows no single creed nor code, and instead expands across the entire spectrum of religious thought. As the vanilla definition of fundamentalism states that fundamentalism is characterized by “strict and literal adherence to a set of basic principles,” religious fundamentalism tends to expand upon this concept substantially. Religious fundamentalism is generally characterized by a zealous, enthusiastic nature towards one’s religion not commonly seen among casual followers, and can result in much more extreme situations of religious bigotry or violence amongst groups. Religious fundamentalism’s long history illustrates this stereotype well, and shows that even with their differences, fundamentalist sects of different religions all have commonalities.

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The term “fundamentalism,” although defined in a secular sense so as to apply the term to any situation which fits said previous definition, is actually derived in its modern usage from a name used to describe a late-19th- and early-20th-century trans-denominational Protestant movement that opposed the accommodation of Christian doctrine to modern scientific theory and philosophy. It is in this original context, in describing religious thought, that the term originated. Religious fundamentalism as a concept, however, stretches much further into the past than the original coining of the term in the 20^th century. Throughout history, theistic attitudes developed from their original, primitive origins as “absolutes;” individuals bowed to the will of a god or gods as their limited understanding of the world around them caused them to turn to supernatural explanations. As the world advanced into the modern age, however, two different general forms of religious schools of thought began to form with changes in society: a more modern movement, akin to what is witnessed in most modern western religions today and believed by more “casual” theists, and a more traditional attitude closer to a fundamentalist viewpoint. This traditionalist perspective is what effectively developed into the modern definition of religious fundamentalism, as a rejection for compromise between religious thought and scientific advancement effectively caused the previously mentioned group of Protestants to branch off from the central, more “casual” group.

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Religious Fundamentalists, however, are not only Christians, and Christians are by no means the largest group of religious fundamentalists. Religious fundamentalism, in its loosest definition, exists in all religions, from Buddhism to Hinduism; Judaism to Taoism. Fundamentalist Jews, for example, tend to believe themselves to be God’s chosen people, and as such feel certain entitlements and other distinctions that they feel place themselves above other religious groups. Most obvious among these beliefs of entitlements are their claims to Palestinian territories, and Israel’s willingness to occupy the area at a whim. Another key example of a fundamentalist sect would be the Church of Latter Day Saints, better known as Mormons. The Mormons, while officially a sect of Christianity, are often considered by most followers of Christ to be pseudo-Christians due to their often peculiar beliefs. Fundamentalist Mormonism is often characterized by peculiar, often foreign beliefs to modern society. Chief among these beliefs would be the practice of polygamy, however other aspects such as the exclusion of African Americans from the priesthood and a form of penance known as “blood atonement,” or the spilling of a sinner’s blood to gain forgiveness, are common to fundamentalist Mormons. To be fair, it should be noted that, officially, polygamy is disallowed by the Church, and many other aspects listed are no longer practiced by “moderate” Mormons.

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Perhaps the most notable group of religious fundamentalists, at least in today’s world, are those among the Islamic religion and its various sects. Following the September 11^th attacks, Islamic fundamentalism took center stage on international news networks and syndicates, and has continued to remain a household name. Islamic fundamentalism is rooted deeply in the Qu’ran and its interpretations, particularly in strict adherence to the teachings of the holy book. A very large percentage of Muslims often take the Qu’ran in some sort of literal sense, aligning themselves with the baseline definition of fundamentalism by default. Islamic fundamentalists, though, often take it a step further, to an area of religious extremism centered around violence and warfare to further their cause. Beyond the normal tenets of Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremism takes a deeply rooted hatred for the west and allows it to spill into a war of holy proportions, known to followers of Islam as jihad and popularized in the modern day by the writings and theories of Islamist scholar and activist Sayyid Qutb. Jihad’s true definition, however, is again disputed and interpreted. Generally, Islamic law defines jihad as a struggle, often armed, in defense of the global Islamic community. The meaning of “defense” can obviously be interpreted in numerous ways, and was interpreted very loosely by Mr. Qutb, a martyr for Islam himself. Qutb described the decadence of the western world, and how it was infecting the morals and ideals of the Muslim world. As such, it was his belief, and the belief of his followers, that those who aligned themselves with these decadent beliefs and promoted them were fit to be killed in order to protect the Islamic religion and maintain the sanctity of “good” Islamic morals.

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People have taken Gospel and hymn literally for centuries, however it has been only recently that such viewpoints towards religion have come to the forefront of news and topics to the rest of society. This is not because society was ignorant of such religious tenets, but rather because western society mostly grew away from such fundamentalist beliefs as its scientific knowledge expanded. As society’s knowledge grew, factions of traditionalists who wished to clench on to their beliefs remained with their core, fundamental religious views. There are those parts of the world where society and religion are closely related, such as Islamic society outside of the west, and where scientific advancements failed to have a real impact upon religious beliefs because they were so deeply rooted in the society. There are also parts of the world where religion is so far removed from society that fundamentalists have little to no influence on daily life, such as in many parts of Japan or the state-atheism of China. But even across these vast geographic distances and distinct cultural boundaries, fundamentalist religious sects all manage to maintain one key similarity: a devotion to their own beliefs which they feel is unrivaled by any others. Some even manage to go the extra step, and show nothing but disdain for the beliefs of others, and yet, others keep taking it further and further. It is likely that, with their common factors causing them to endure against one another, the fires of fundamentalism and extremism will burn for as long as the human race draws breath.

The Bush Legacy: A Brief on the Effects of Neoconservative Foreign Policy on Modern American Politics

[The following is an editorial written for The Spartan Outlook newspaper's 2008-09 second edition. The more I read it back, the worse I think it is, particularly because a lot of it is just generalized un-researched bullshit, and especially since the end of the article makes me sound like one of those Goddamned teabaggers. But it filled up a ton of space, which was really nice. Written 13 Jan 2009.]

For the past eight years, George W. Bush has filled our nation’s highest office and has acted as the figurehead leader of the free world. But just what, exactly, has he accomplished while in office? Or, perhaps more importantly, what effects will his actions have on the face of American politics in the future? Bush’s legacy is one unlike most other presidents: it is notable not for achievements but more for downfalls. Though his policies and his actions were mostly “legal” in perhaps the loosest definition or interpretation of the term, they still left a strong distaste in the mouths of most Americans. The PATRIOT Act, the invasion of Iraq, and the labeling of an “Axis of Evil” are only a few examples of the Bush administration’s many follies. It is sufficient to say that Bush’s simplistic views of good and evil alienated a good portion of the American people, and they have perhaps ushered in a new, somewhat dark chapter for American politics, at least from my viewpoint.

It must be clarified first that, according to my own beliefs, Bush is a leftist. Although in the American political spectrum he is considered to be a right-wing conservative, by my standpoint he is quite far from this label. I personally ascribe to the European and early American definition of liberalism; a variety often referred to as “classical liberalism” or, more popularly lately, libertarianism. The use of the term “libertarianism” mostly rose as a result of the advent of the new American school of liberal thought, which advocates social democracy and a largely leftist economic policy.

Bush, however, obviously does not fall in with these aforementioned members of the American left. Instead, he is a member of a group in the Republican Party known as the “neoconservatives” or more popularly the “neocons,” a fringe group of conservatives who combine the belief of preserving traditional values with a more American-centric foreign policy, however at the same time are comfortable with the idea of a minor-welfare state and intervention in business. In particular, neoconservatives support the extensive use of American economic and military power to expand the nation’s agenda on the international stage. Bush exemplified this philosophy with an aggressive and belligerent foreign policy coupled with an attitude that overstated the United States’ role as the sole remaining “super power” following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although acknowledging the “coalition of the willing,” Bush’s foreign policy mostly guided the United States away from too much involvement in cooperative efforts with the international community. Neoconservatives are generally reluctant to abide by multi-lateral treaties, and the lessening of US involvement in the once crucial NATO perfectly exemplifies this ideal that the United States is to be treated as a superior entity. In layman’s terms, neoconservatives generally hold that the world is the United States’ sandbox, and the United States is the “big kid” who chooses who plays and who sits out; from time to time the US must also “deal with” those who don’t play by the rules set down by the big kid. While Bush’s foreign policy towards “enemies” of the United States (read: human rights abusing tinpots and other undesirables) didn’t particularly bother me, the alienation and subordination of allies of the United States was a major downfall of neocon foreign policy for me, and for many Americans. Although obviously domestic policy has much to do with approval ratings, public opinion, and polling performance, I’ll mostly be sticking with the foreign policy aspects of Bush’s regime, as I like to think of that as more my area of “expertise.”

The September 11 attacks were perhaps Bush’s and, by and large, the neoconservatives’ shining moment for a short while. In the days following the 9/11 attacks, the nation was left tired and cold; afraid of the outside world as the nation had been struck a hard blow on its own soil by men from places many Americans could not even pronounce. This served as a prime opportunity for the neocons: neoconservative think-tanks often centered around the middle east as the most likely target that required American influence as the central, more disorganized states of the Middle East lacked such an influence; neoconservative American-centric policy saw the Middle East as the perfect mold for the expansion of America’s influence. Afghanistan proved to be the much-needed foothold. A fast and decisive air campaign, followed by covert strikes and an eventual rollover made Afghanistan a quick, easy target for the United States’ military muscle (at least initially; the insurgency afterward proved to be considerably more a problem). This ‘victory’ gave America the chance to plant its flag in a region much devoid of American influence since Reagan’s administration gave weapons to the mujahideen. “Terrorism” became a scare word and an effective tool for the neoconservatives to maintain a support base. The 9/11 acts, for a time, ushered in a period of 21^st century McCarthyism with regard to racial profiling against Middle Easterners.

Afghanistan proved to be an easy launchpad for Bush to expand the “Empire of Liberty” and its influence. His next target, however, was a much bigger prize to be conquered. It was a target often concentrated upon by neocon think tanks as the best target to flex America’s military muscle unilaterally against: Sadaam Hussein and his middle eastern czardom. Iraq, however, proved to be a much more complicated issue as the ethnic tensions and American-aimed hatred caused the nation to fracture into numerous factions following the collapse of Sadaam’s government; all of them fought against one another and most of them were hostile to the United States. Crippling casualties combined with numerous reports of atrocities and civil rights abuses by American troops and their associates turned Iraq from a simple measure in “finding weapons of mass destruction” [a casus belli left ambiguous as to the definition of WMD's, as well as a reported lack of hard evidence for such an action despite strong belief (we won't get into the mythical WMD's, though)] into a situation compared often to Vietnam. Iraq was perhaps one of the final nails in the neoconservatives’ collective coffin, as illustrated with the most recent victory of Barack Obama over John McCain. McCain, although not really a neoconservative, did display some neoconservative tendencies following Bush’s influence.

On that note, however, is Bush’s legacy and impact on modern American politics with regard to Obama’s victory in the general election. Despite the long road of war he ultimately followed, Bush’s true legacy stems not from the direct effects of what he has done, but instead lies with the effects his actions have had on American politics in the long term. Eight years of neoconservative foreign policy have left much of America both war-weary and weary of being regarded by the international community as a nation of bullies. The possible ramifications, however, are of more concern to me than Bush’s initial policies. With the blending of all political affiliations into essentially three groups: Democrat, Republican, and “Other” (of which I must say I reside most in the third), the oversimplifcation of political affiliations has severely hurt the Republican Party for, what I fear, may be several elections to come. The Republican Party has been shown a huge defeat in the most recent election, and will be forced to revamp and change in order to keep pace with the rising tide of Obama’s social democratism. I fear, however, that American politics can only shift further left into the likes of what Europe’s socialist welfare-state atmosphere has become. The American people, being weary of neoconservative rule, have mostly now associated neoconservatives as being the face of the Republican Party. Although the neoconservatives are but a small fraction of the Republican Party’s membership, the association has been enough to strike a deathblow to the GOP. The GOP is now placed with a pivotal decision of where to go, however there is no clear answer to this question. A fracture of sorts is entirely possible, with hardline conservatives and those neocons who cling fruitlessly to their dead ideals split with the more moderate and libertarian Republicans of the party. The Democratic Party, in contrast, is a mostly homogeneous entity with support for widespread socio-economic reform on varied levels. The only logical result to such a schism in the Republican Party is the strengthening of leftism in the face of economic liberalism and freedom, even as the Republican Party’s convoluted ideals served very little to meet those same ends.